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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20010113-CA 
v. : 
TRACY MICHAH ALLRED, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a jury conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute in a public park, an enhanced second degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 
58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii), (4) (Supp. 2000) (R3-5, 148). This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Can this Court review the pretrial ruling admitting defendant's post-Miranda} 
confession, where the bulk of the evidence relied upon by the trial court at the 
suppression hearing- -a transcript of the preliminary hearing- -is not part of the record 
on appeal? 
'See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
1 
Where an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing 
court presumes the regularity of proceedings below. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 
17, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997); State v. 
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983); J.V. 
Hatch Constr. Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8, 11 (Utah App. 1998). 
2. Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion to deny defendant's motion 
for mistrial? 
A trial court's denial of a mistrial motion will not be reversed "[ujnless a review of 
the record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely 
influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, [the 
reviewing ] will not find that the court's decision was an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah 1997). This deferential review is due to the 
"advantaged position of the trial judge to determine the impact of events occurring in the 
courtroom on the total proceedings[.]" Id. See also State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, f 38, 
993 P.2d 837 (reiterating Robertson standard). 
3. Did the trial court properly exclude, as unreliable hearsay, evidence that a 
defense witness heard another individual claim ownership of the black bag in an alleged 
excited utterance, approximately one and one-half hours after defendant's confession and 
arrest? 
2 
"The standard of review when considering the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements under the Utah Rules of Evidence depends on whether the trial court's analysis 
involves a factual or legal determination or some combination thereof." State v. Parker, 
2000 UT 5 1 ^ 13, 4 P-3d 778. Factual findings as to the nature, timing and reliability of 
the statements are reviewed for clear error. Id. The trial court's ultimate determination 
of admissibility is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See West Valley City v. Hutto, 2000 
UT App 188, f 9, 5 P.3d 1 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994), for 
abuse of discretion standard). But see Salt Lake City v. Alires, 2000 UT App 244, f 8, 9 
P.3d 769 (citing Pena but applying correctness standard). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES 
Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2): 
Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or 
conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant 
shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such 
finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to 
correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the 
transcript. 
Utah R. Evid. 803(2): 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: . . . Excited Utterance. A statement 
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under 
the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute in a public park, an enhanced second degree felony (R3-5). 
Motion to Suppress Admissions. Defendant moved to suppress his pre- and post-
Miranda admissions (R32-35). At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant called 
one witness, Sonya Ortiz, and the State called none (Rl 88:3-16) (a complete copy of the 
transcript is contained in addendum A).2 Both parties relied on testimony given at the 
preliminary hearing (R188:3, 17-18, 20-45), add. A.3 
Ruling on Motion to Suppress. The trial court ruled from the bench that 
defendant's pre-Miranda admission was inadmissible, but took under advisement the 
admissibility of the later warned statement (Rl 88:39-45), add. B. Thereafter, the trial 
court ruled that defendant's second, warned statement was admissible (R189:l-4) (a copy 
of the oral ruling is contained in addendum C). The trial court's written Findings of Fact 
2
 Although the transcript itself reflects a date of 1 September 2001 (see R188), the 
corresponding minute entry reflects that the hearing was held on 5 September 2001(s££ 
R41-42). 
3The preliminary hearing was held on 11 July 2001 (R25-26). Although the 
parties and the trial court had copies of the preliminary hearing transcript below, it is not 
apparent on the record whether the copies were from an official or unofficial 
transcription. In any event, defendant did not request that the preliminary hearing be 
transcribed for purposes of appeal, nor did he designate the preliminary hearing as part of 
the record on appeal (Rl 61-167) (copies of the pertinent documents are contained in 
addendum B). 
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and Conclusions of Law were filed after trial on 15 February 2001 (R172-178) (a copy is 
contained in addendum D). 
Trial. Following a one-day jury trial on 12 September 2000, defendant was 
convicted as charged (R148). 
Sentence. On 5 January 2001, the trial court imposed the statutory term of from 
one-to-fifteen-years, with credit for time served (R156-157). 
Notice of Appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R159). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Officers Dimond and Evans were patrolling Liberty Park looking for drug activity 
on 9 June 2000, when they made contact with defendant and five other individuals sitting 
on a picnic table near the basketball court (Rl90:125-127). As the officers approached 
the group at the picnic table, defendant "made a quick movement down towards his 
pocket and then turned and sat down on the table facing away [from the officers]" 
(R190:128, 162). Officer Evans "walked up, asked them how they were doing, told them 
about the problems that [he] had experienced in, around in [that] area of the park, that's 
particularly the basketball courts," and asked the group if they had observed any drug 
activity in the area (Rl90:130,163). All six responded negatively (R190:130). The 
officers then asked for identification from the group and ran warrants checks (id.). 
Finding no warrants, the officers did not plan to detain anyone (R190:131). 
5 
As the officers made ready to leave the area, they observed a black bag sitting by 
the end of the bench, with no one sitting near it (R190:131, 164). None of the six 
individuals claimed the bag, nor did anyone else in the immediate vicinity (R190:132, 
164). When the officers looked inside for some identification they saw "some car 
stereos," a couple baggies of marijuana, and approximately 82 empty baggies, sandwich 
size and smaller, one-inch square size (R190:132, 164-165). The officers took each of the 
six individuals aside individually and asked them again if the bag belonged to any one of 
them (R190:146, 166, 177). All six again denied knowing anything about the black bag 
(R190-.166, 178). 
At this juncture the officers conferred with one another, in front of the group of 
six, as to the advisability of bringing a drug dog to the scene, and which type (R190:147). 
Specifically, there are two types of police dogs: Canines (German Shepherds) and 
Bloodhounds (R190:154). The German Shepherds are used for tracking and for sniffing 
drugs and "can be used to apprehend suspects if a person runs" (id.). However, German 
Shepherds are "sometimes mean" (R190:179). "[T]hey're trained to play with drugs as a 
toy and they think it's a toy and so when they locate . . . a drug they kind of start playing 
with it like it's a toy, and that's how they indicate there's a drug there" (R190:179). The 
officers discussed that a German Shepherd had once "nipped" someone's backside 
because he had drugs stuffed there (R190:180). 
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Accordingly, Officer Dimond was concerned about bringing a German Shepherd 
to the scene because "there's a possibility that they could get bit" (R190:148). Therefore, 
the officers determined to bring the Bloodhound instead (R190:154-155). The 
Bloodhound is "fairly new to [the] police department," and "is a very friendly dog. It's a 
big Bloodhound like McGraw, and it's used to track. It can sniff people. You just give it 
a small article of clothing and it can sniff exactly where that person's been, based on just 
that one smell, and so it's used only to find people or, or things" (R190:154). 
Following this discussion between the officers, but prior to the Bloodhound's 
arrival, defendant volunteered that the black bag belonged to him (R190:155, 180). 
Because the trial court made a pretrial ruling that defendant's pre-Miranda admission 
was not admissible, the prosecutor asked broadly whether "at some point" the officers 
had occasion to arrest defendant (R190:167). Officer Evans responded affirmatively and 
indicated that after arresting defendant, he "told him he wanted to ask a few questions, 
and asked defendant if he had ever been read his Miranda rights (id.). When defendant 
responded affirmatively, the officer asked if he understood those rights and defendant 
again responded affirmatively (id.). Thereafter, Officer Evans explained the Miranda 
rights to defendant and defendant agreed to talk (id.). Specifically, defendant said that 
the black bag and marijuana belonged to him, "that he had been selling marijuana for 
approximately two months in the park" (R190:168). 
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In obtaining defendant's confession, Officer Evans at no time removed his gun 
from his duty belt (R190:169). Moreover, defendant gave no indication that he was 
fearful about the Bloodhound, which, in any event, was never let out of the police 
vehicle in which it arrived (R190:170). 
Defendant called one witness, Sonya Ortiz, who was one of the six people present 
at the picnic table at the time of his arrest (R 190:271-304). According to Ortiz, another 
individual,known to her only as "Clay," was present at the picnic table when the police 
initially approached, but immediately left the area (Rl90:276, 281, 288). Clay came back 
to the picnic table about one and one-half hours after defendant's arrest (R191:281, 286). 
According to Ortiz, Clay was "angry," specifically, he was "yelling and swearing" 
(Rl90:282, 287). Upon objection from the prosecutor, the trial court precluded Ortiz 
from testifying that Clay stated, "The bag was mine. That stuff was mine" (Rl 90:296). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point L This Court cannot review the pretrial ruling admitting defendant's post-
Miranda confession where the bulk of the evidence relied upon by the trial court at the 
suppression hearing-a transcript of the preliminary hearing-is not part of the record on 
appeal. Given this circumstance, this Court should presume the regularity, or correctness, 
of the trial court's ruling. 
Point II. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny defendant's 
motion for mistrial. First, defendant fails to demonstrate that the parties' pretrial 
8 
stipulation was violated by testimony that police also saw stereos in defendants black bag. 
Even if the testimony violated the pretrial stipulation, any error in its admission was 
harmless because defendant was not charged with stealing the stereos, and the jury was 
not told of his admission regarding the stolen the stereos. Thus, given the incriminating 
evidence that defendant claimed the marijuana in the bag and admitted selling it, a 
reasonable jury would have convicted him for the drug crime with or without the 
innocuous references to the stereos. 
Second, any possible prejudice resulting from Officer Evans's reference to a prior 
administration of Miranda rights was cured by the trial court's curative statement giving 
the jury a neutral explanation for the reference. This Court generally presumes that a jury 
will follow the instructions given it. Defendant does not claim and the record does not 
indicate that the curative instruction was ineffective. 
Point III. The trial court properly excluded, as unreliable hearsay, evidence that a 
defense witness overheard another essentially unknown individual claim the black bag 
approximately one and one/half hours after defendant's confession and arrest. The 
declarant's "discovery" that the bag he earlier abandoned was missing does not amount to 
the type of shocking or frightening event classically associated with the excited utterance 
exception to the hearsay rule. Rather, the circumstances of this case suggest that the 
declarant, if he existed at all, reasonably anticipated that police may well seize the 
abandoned bag and the contraband therein. Even if the exclusion was erroneous, it was 
9 
harmless in light of defendant's weightier confession that the bag and the marijuana 
inside belonged to him. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO INCLUDE IN THE 
RECORD THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT UPON 
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT RELIED IN DENYING THE 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS POST MIRANDA ADMISSION, THIS 
COURT MUST PRESUME THAT THE TRIAL COURT RULED 
CORRECTLY 
Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling denying his motion to suppress his 
post-Miranda admissions, claiming he was coerced to confess in violation of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Aplt. Br. at 15-28. Because the record on appeal does not 
contain the preliminary hearing transcript upon which the trial court's ruling was based, 
this Court must affirm. 
In lieu of a full evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties opted to 
rely on the preliminary hearing transcript (R188:3), add. A. Accordingly, only one 
witness, Sonya Ortiz, testified at the abbreviated motion to suppress hearing (Rl 88:3-15), 
add. A. Thereafter, the parties argued to the trial court, relying on evidence adduced at 
the preliminary hearing, which the trial court had previously reviewed (R188:3, 16-18, 
20-40), add. A. As the underlying facts were not otherwise adduced during the 
suppression hearing, the trial court necessarily relied upon the preliminary hearing 
transcript in making its factual findings which include the following: 
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34. After each of the six people asked denied knowing to whom the bag 
belonged the officers engaged in a conversation between themselves about 
different ways in which they might determine the bag's owner. 
35. During that conversation, conducted within earshot of all six people, the 
officers considered aloud whether they should call in a K-9 unit. 
36. As part of the discussion about the possibility of a K-9 unit, one of the 
officers made a comment about some of the police dogs being meaner than 
others. 
37. Officer Evans remarked that Salt Lake County had a dog that had nipped at 
a suspects' backside because the dog had alerted on drugs located in the 
suspect's pants. 
38. The officers never indicated to any person that a dog would bite them if 
they turned out to be the owner of the bag. 
39. There was no police dog present at the scene during the conversation about 
the dog. 
40. Defendant then indicated to Officer Dimond that the bag belonged to him. 
41. Defendant was then placed under arrest, and Officer Evans read defendant 
his Miranda rights. 
42. Post-Miranda, defendant described to Officer Evans the contents of the 
bag, and the origin of those items. He indicated, among other things, that 
the green leafy substance inside the bag was marijuana and that he had been 
selling marijuana because he could not get a job. 
43. Sometime around the time that defendant was arrested, Officer Serio 
arrived at the scene with a police dog. 
44. Officer Serio was driving a marked Salt Lake City Police car that did not 
bear any markings identifying it as a K-9 unit. 
(R176-177),add.D. 
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded: 
11 
1. Defendant's initial statement to Officer Dimond, in which defendant 
admitted to ownership of the black bag, was made without benefit of the 
Miranda warnings, and is thus admissible at trial. 
2. However, defendant's initial statement admitting ownership, while violative 
of Miranda, was made voluntarily and was not the product of coercion. In 
the absence of such coercion on the part of law enforcement, there is no 
violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the 
"fruit of the poison tree" doctrine does not apply. 
3. Defendant's post-Miranda statements are admissible pursuant to the 
principles announced in Oregon v. Els tad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) and State v. 
Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995). Specifically, the Court has examined 
whether a "a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by 
any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the 
suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process 
that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some 
indeterminate period." Troyer, 910 P.2d at 1189 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. 
at 309). 
4. In the instant case, although defendant's initial statement was made without 
benefit of Miranda warnings, it was unaccompanied by actual coercion. 
Therefore, the absence of Miranda prior to the initial statement does not 
sufficiently taint the investigatory process so as to render ineffective the 
subsequent waiver. 
5. The defendant made a voluntary and informed waiver of his Miranda rights 
before making the second statement. 
6. Therefore, the Court concludes that the defendant's Motion to Suppress is 
granted with respect to his initial, pre-Miranda statement admitting 
ownership of the black bag in question, and denied as to defendant's post-
Miranda statements reaffirming ownership and describing the contents of 
the bag. 
(R177-178),add.D.4 
4In denying defendant's related motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the 
close of the State's case at trial, the trial court reaffirmed its pretrial ruling denying 
12 
Defendant never moved to admit the preliminary hearing transcript, nor did he 
designate and/or certify it as part of the record on appeal (R161-164), add. B. Without 
the preliminary hearing transcript, this Court cannot review the trial court's conclusion 
that police questioning was not coercive. Consequently, it must affirm. 
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires the appellant to include 
in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to any finding or conclusion appellant 
claims is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence. "In essence, Rule 11 directs 
counsel to provide this Court with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal." 
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 
1989). Where an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing 
court presumes the regularity of proceedings below. Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 
P.2d 1049, 1053 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Linden, 
761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988) (per curiam) (jury voir dire recorded but not 
transcribed). 
The burden to ensure that the record contains the materials necessary to support an 
appeal rests with the appellant. Linden, 761 P.2d at 1388; State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 
307, 309 (Utah 1985). An appellate court will not "speculate on the existence of facts 
defendant's motion to suppress his post-Miranda admission, observing in part that "it's 
even clearer after hearing the evidence that there was an absence of coercion in his 
statement" (see R191:267-269). Defendant has not challenged the trial court's denial of 
his motion to dismiss on appeal. 
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that do not appear in the record." Id. "When crucial matters are not included in the 
record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court." Id. 
See also Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033 
(1990); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 
773 (Utah 1985); State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 1983); State v. Jones, 657 
P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982). "Absent that recordfj defendant's assignment of error 
stands as a unilateral allegation which the review court has power to determine. This 
Court simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts 
unsupported by the record." State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) (quoting State 
v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986) (in turn quoting State v. Wulffenstein, 657 
P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983))). Moreover, "[njeither 
the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the 
relevant portions of the transcript." Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). 
Officers Dimond and Evans' trial testimony is before this Court, and it is this trial 
testimony which defendant primarily in his Statement of the Facts and in the body of his 
argument. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 8-11, 24-27. However, defendant did not renew his 
motion to suppress after the officers testimony came in {see, e.g.9 R190:218-258, 266-
267). Moreover, there is no guarantee that the same evidence was adduced at trial as was 
adduced at the preliminary hearing. This is why most appellate courts (Utah has no rule), 
in reviewing the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, will consider only 
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evidence before the court at the suppression hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 
978 F.2d 722, 724-725 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Baez v. State, 425 S.E.2d 885, 890 (Ga. App. 
1992); State v. Ryder, 315 N.W.2d 786, 788-789 (Iowa 1982); Aiken v. State, 647 A.2d 
1229, 1232 (Md. App. 1994), cert, denied, 651 A.2d 854 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. 
Powers, 398 A.2d 1013, 1014 (Pa. 1979); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§11.1(c) (1987). 
Some appellate courts will consider both pretrial and trial evidence in reviewing a 
pretrial ruling. However, courts endorsing this rule generally do so in the context of 
affirming the trial court's pretrial ruling. United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1021-1022 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 575 (1993); United States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236, 
1239-1240 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 
1987); State v. Young, 576 So.2d 1048, 1054 n.l, 1055 (La. Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Duncan, 879 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Contra State v. Kong, 883 P.2d 
686, 688 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1994) (reversal). 
The principle unifying these cases is that an appellate court may affirm, but will 
not reverse, a ruling based on evidence not before the district court at the time it ruled. 
The State is aware of no jurisdiction following the rule that an appellate court may 
reverse a pretrial ruling based only on evidence presented at trial without considering 
evidence presented at the pretrial hearing. 
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Consequently, in the absence of crucial portions of the record, this Court should 
presume the correctness of the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION 
TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
A. Clarification of Proceedings Below. 
Pretrial Stipulation. Prior to the beginning of trial on 11 September 2000, the 
parties stipulated on the record that Officers Dimond and Evans would not testify as to 
the statements defendant made with respect to the origin of the car stereos found in 
defendant's bag with the marijuana (R190:14-15, R190:230-231) (copies of the pertinent 
transcript pages are contained in addendum E). Trial counsel stated the stipulation as 
follows: 
Your Honor, there is one matter that I think we need to put on the record 
that [the prosecutor] and I have agreed to, but just so that the Court's aware 
of it. As the Court is I'm sure aware from our Motion hearing, the bag in 
question contained what appears to be marijuana and ultimately was tested 
to be, as well as some other property which included car stereos and face 
plates from stereos. It's my understanding that [the prosecutor] has 
instructed her witnesses « . . . - not to mention specifically what they are. I 
think what she's planning to do was simply ask them did [defendant] 
explain the other property or, but not go into what the property is or not go 
into what specifically what [defendant] said about the other property. 
(R190:14-15),add.E. 
Trial Testimony. Thereafter, the prosecutor elicited the following testimony from 
Officers Dimond and Evans without objection from trial counsel: 
PROSECUTOR: When you looked in this black bag, initially what was 
the first thing you saw? 
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OFFICER DIMOND: There was, there was some car stereos inside the bag. 
There was a baggie of marijuana. 
PROSECUTOR: Okay, when you looked into that bag what did you 
observe? 
OFFICER EVANS: I observed a couple stereos, couple, some tools. I 
observed a couple baggies with green leafy substance 
inside. 
(R190:133, 165), add. E. 
Additionally, Officer Evans' responded to the prosecutor's question about the first 
thing he did following defendant's arrest as follows: 
OFFICER EVANS: After he'd been placed? I just told him I wanted to ask 
him a few questions and I asked him if he had ever 
been read his Miranda rights. He said yes. 
PROSECUTOR: Okay. 
OFFICER EVANS: I said do you understand those? He said yes. Then I 
went through and explained what his rights were and 
asked if he would like to talk to me. 
(R190:167-168),add.E. 
Following Officer Evans, the State called two more witnesses before concluding 
its case (R190:190, 203, 218). 
Motion for Mistrial Based on Alleged Violation of Parties' Pretrial Stipulation. 
Defendant first complained about a possible violation of the parties pretrial stipulation 
during an in camera conference with the trial court, after the State had rested (Rl90:224), 
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add. E. Specifically, trial counsel moved for a mistrial, indicating it was her 
understanding that 
the State's witnesses were not going to bring to the jury's attention the fact 
that there were car stereos in the bag, State's Exhibit 1, and it's my 
recollection that both Officer Dimond and Officer Evans did, in fact, 
mention those. Although they did not specify anything about [defendant's] 
statement in regard to those. I believe that's in violation of our stipulation 
and, further the stipulation in my view at least was based on the fact that 
that's an indication of some prior or other bad acts which I believe is 
prohibited by Rule 404 and that was my reason for speaking with [the 
prosecutor] about it. 
{id). 
Prosecutor's Response. The prosecutor responded that she understood the parties 
pretrial stipulation to be that she 
would not ask the officers, nor would they testify about the statements 
[defendant] made with respect to the origin of the stuff in the bags, 
specifically the car stereos were stolen, and I didn't ask them that and they 
didn't testify to that. I don't believe it was ever a part of the stipulation that 
we would ever hide what was in the bag or that we would not discuss the 
other items that were in the bag besides the marijuana. 
My, my understanding of the stipulation was that I would not ask the 
officers and they would not testify as to [defendant's] statement that the 
stereos had been stolen. 
(R190:230),add.E. 
Ruling. The trial court agreed with the prosecutor's recollection of the parties' 
stipulation: 
That was my understanding that there would be no lengthy discussion of the 
stereos, that what would occur would be a brief description of what was 
seen in the black bag, that there would be absolutely no inference or follow-
up on the potential source of the stereos. 
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So, I'm going to deny the motion for mistrial on that, and in closing, 
the State may not allude to it. The defense, however, may allude to it. If 
there's some way that you think it can help you and you can clean it up 
because the best thing, the best possibility - and I remember this vividly -
the stipulation, I should have on my own motion probably ruled that the 
stereo heads or whatever they were, were not even to be referenced has 
having been in the bag. But that was not the stipulation as I recall it. There 
was no reason for it to be discussed and consequently, it would have been 
cleaner had it not been, but I see no violation in the stipulation 
(R190:230-231), add. E. The prosecutor then sought clarification from the trial court 
that she would be able to argue to the jury that defendant made comments to the officers 
indicating he knew what was in the bag which "is evidence of the fact that the bag was 
his" (Rl90:231-232), add. E. The trial court agreed so long as the prosecutor did not 
allude to the stereos: "You may say that [defendant] made reference to what items were 
in the bag, described a few of the different things and by his description it was clear that 
he had seen the inner contents of the bag" (Rl 90:232), add. E. 
Motion for Mistrial Based on Officer Evans's Reference to Possible Prior 
Administration of Miranda Rights. At the same time defendant moved for a mistrial 
based on the "stereo" evidence, he also moved for a mistrial based on Officer Evans' 
reference to a possible prior administration of Miranda rights, to which defendant also 
initially raised no objection (R190:224-225), add. E. 
Ruling. The trial court remarked that she had not even heard Officer Evans' 
testimony regarding the prior Miranda warning and noted if she had missed it, "perhaps 
the jury did as well" (R190:225-226), add. E. The prosecutor agreed that Officer Evans 
had so testified, but pointed out that defendant did not object, or move to strike (id.). The 
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trial court agreed: "That's true. There was no motion to strike, no ability to clarify it 
because of that-" (id.). Trial counsel said her non-objection was strategic: "I 
intentionally did not object because if I objected, that's just going to bring it to the jury's 
attention even more . . . I tactically decided to make a motion for mistrial based on the 
testimony rather than take the chance of bringing - . . . - further attention to it" (id.). The 
trial court indicated she understood the strategy, but also pointed out that 
[t]he problem is that when you make that strategic determination and don't 
raise the issue, and certainly you don't raise it in front of the jury anyway, 
you say you need a brief recess and, in fact, we did take a recess around that 
time. You call it to my attention and there a number of ways in which it can 
be handled by my making some kind of curative statement. It is, however, 
an incredibly stupid thing to have said and I missed it, which the only good 
thing, because if I missed it, perhaps the jury did as well. 
(Rl90:226), add. E. 
The trial court then had trial counsel restate the complained of Miranda testimony 
and trial counsel recalled that Officer Evans testified, "I asked [defendant] if he had been 
Mirandized before and he said yes and I said to him then you understand what it means -" 
(id.). The trial court responded, 
Okay, I don't think then it's the problem that I initially saw it to be. I know 
unfortunately what Officer Evans meant and you know what Officer Evans 
meant. But the jury has no way of knowing what Officer Evans meant and 
he could have meant were you Mirandized a few minutes ago. It does not 
necessarily allude to or reference another time and another crime. He 
doesn't say were you Mirandized on another case. Have you ever been 
arrested before? Have you ever been charged with a crime before? He just 
says have you been Mirandized before - . . . - which could have been 
in the last 15 minutes. 
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(R190:227), add. E. The trial court then offered to "make some kind of curative 
statement if you'd like me to[,]" and further stated she was "inclined to deny to the 
motion for a mistrial" (id.). 
Trial counsel initially declined the offered curative statement: "Your Honor, it 
would not be my request that the Court make any sort of curative statement. In my view, 
if any or all of the jurors did not notice that statement, then that would simply bring it to 
their attention and I'm, I'm concerned about that happening[.]" (id.). In response, the 
trial court gave an example of what the proposed curative statement would entail: 
What about if I were merely to say at an appropriate point in time, 
incidentally we use a lot of words in court like preliminary hearings and 
Miranda, words that we in the legal system know the meaning of and you 
may not know the meaning of. Just so you understand Miranda are the 
rights that are given by a law enforcement officer, typically on a card, and 
they talk about you have the right to remain silent, etc., and it's frequently a 
situation where one officer with another officer may do the Mirandizing 
and the other officer may not and they'll check to see if one has, has given 
the Miranda rights to the defendant. It being generic like that does not 
misrepresent the facts. Because that is certainly something that happens 
where on officer will ask if a suspect has been Mirandizedby his partner, or 
the other officer there. 
I don't know if that helps or hurts. But I offer it as a possible 
solution and I can give it in the context that a broader description of some 
legal terms so that it doesn't sound like we're just pulling out one concept 
and one term and drawing attention to it and I'd be happy to do that 
(Rl90:227-228), add. E. The trial court further emphasized that Officer Evans' 
testimony had been "innocuous, did not imply a prior criminal record," and that she 
would not 
mis-try it and the main reason is that the manner in which it was stated does 
not imply to the average person listening any prior problems with the law. 
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It is neutral in that respect. It certainly could connote the other to a 
sophisticated person in the legal environment and for that reason I wish the 
statement had not been made. But I think to the average lay person it does 
not have that connotation 
(R190:234),add.E. 
Following a recess and consultation with defendant, trial counsel urged the trial 
court to give the suggested curative statement: 
[W}e would like the Court to make a statement to the jurors such as you 
suggested before about the reading of rights and indicating that sometimes 
officers will check with a person and see if one of the officers have, have 
read the rights or not to, to have that information before they do that, or, 
you put it in a lot better that I did -
(R190:235), add. E. Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
All right, you may all be seated. . . . In [sic] occurred to me while I 
had you out there waiting and while counsel was visiting about a couple of 
the legal points that there are a lot of terms that we use when we do a trial 
and even though I'm sure all of you have degrees of college, we've got a 
very bright jury here, even so and even given that on t.v. now you hear a lot 
about the legal system. For some reason they find it more fascinating than 
those of us involved in it do. But even so, there are a lot of terms that are 
kind of alien or unknown to many lay people and I just wanted to allude to 
that. 
Chain is one of those term. Obviously, you know, if you have a 
chain around your wrist that's different than what was being discussed in 
here. Chain is a link from one person who has control of evidence to the 
next person who has control, and that's a legal term that I just wanted to 
make sure you understood. 
We've talked about burden of proof and I'll talk about that more in 
the instructions that I give you on the law, and proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, which is the standard in any criminal case, and I'll define that at 
some length, because it's a concept that we grapple with and that is very 
important. So these are terms that you hear and hopefully you won't find 
them confusing. 
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We also referenced Miranda and I think most of you have probably 
heard about Miranda. It's been in effect now about 50 years actually. But 
Miranda, just so you know, is something that occurs frequently in an 
investigation when a police officer or police officers are talking to someone 
and they want to get information and they want to put the person on notice, 
as they should, that the person's statements may come back and may be 
used in court and that they have the right to a lawyer, etc., etc. 
Now in this case there was a reference to Miranda which was given 
and one officer was not sure whether another officer had given it. The 
Miranda rights, now you know what we were referring to if you didn't 
before. 
So as we go through the trial if I hear a term such as that, or it 
appears that there's something like chain that may not be clear in the 
manner of its usage, while it's an ordinary word, we may stop and just visit 
about that briefly as we just did, and in the instructions that I give you on 
the law there will be considerable help in terms of defining terms, the 
burden of proof, etc. 
One of the other things we tell you throughout the trial because it's 
so important is the defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent 
and these are important rights and the other concepts are very important and 
so they're reduced to what we call legal instructions and I will read those 
when the trial is over. There are about 30 of them, but they're short, they 
don't take very long and they you'll take them with you into the jury room 
and hopefully all the questions I haven't answered about terms and what not 
will become clear as you look at those. 
(R190:237-239),add.E. 
After the jury had been excused for the day, the trial court observed to the parties: 
I did not notice as I spoke that any of the jurors seemed to think that the 
conversation was out of the ordinary. I don't think I highlighted any 
particular aspect. At least I tried not to by beginning with a discussion of 
chain and talking about burden of proof and Miranda. So I'm hopeful that 
if the jury heard that it cleaned it up and they're well aware that when two 
officers work together one may Mirandize a suspect and another not and 
they're never clear. 
(R190:242),add.E. 
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B. Defendant Fails to Show Any Error in the Trial Court's 
Determination That the Officers' "Stereo" Testimony Did Not 
Violate the Pretrial Stipulation; However, Even Assuming Error, 
the Innocuous "Stereo" Testimony Did Not Prejudice Defendant 
On appeal, defendant complains that the trial court erred in denying his mistrial 
motion after finding that the officers' "stereo" testimony did not violate the parties 
pretrial stipulation. Aplt. Br. at 28-37. However, defendant's bald appellate declaration 
that the "stereo" testimony violated the stipulation does not make it so. Id. Indeed, trial 
counsel's articulation of the parties' stipulation (see R190:14-15), add. E, is equally 
susceptible to the prosecutor's and the trial court's interpretation, that the prosecutor 
would not go into detail regarding the stereos and would not, in particular, elicit 
testimony from the officers' regarding defendant's admission that he stole the stereos 
found with the marijuana (see R190:230-231), add. E. The trial court's ruling should be 
upheld on this ground. 
Even if this Court determines the testimony did run afoul of the pretrial stipulation, 
any error was harmless. State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 69 (citing State v. Hamilton, 827 
P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)). First, the "stereo" testimony was buried in the middle of a 
two-day proceeding and roughly 115 pages of witness testimony (see Rl 90:125-218; 
R191:262-265,271-288). Second, defendant was not charged with an offense relating to 
the stolen stereos and the jury was not told of defendant's admission that he stole the 
stereos found with the marijuana (see Rl90:230-231), add. E. Third, the prosecutor did 
not reference the stereos in her closing argument, but did properly emphasize that "when 
given the opportunity to identify the owner of the bag, [defendant] identified himself 
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{see R191:321). Thus, given the incriminating evidence that defendant claimed 
ownership of the marijuana and admitted selling it because he could not find a job 
(R190:168), add. E, any reasonable jury would have convicted him for the drug crime 
with or without the innocuous references to the stereos also found in the black bag. 
Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 69; Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240. 
C. The Trial Court's Well-Crafted Statement Cured Any Possible 
Negative Inference Jurors Might Have Drawn From Officer Evans' 
Reference to a Prior Administration of Miranda Rights 
As for defendant's remaining mistrial ground, i.e., Officer Evans's reference to a 
possible prior administration of Miranda rights, the trial court's statement cured any 
possible prejudice. The trial court offered to give the curative statement, even though the 
trial court itself had not heard the obscure reference and doubted whether the jurors had 
noted it {see R190:225-226, 242), add. E. Defendant initially resisted the trial court's 
offer for fear it would draw the jury's attention to the matter; however, he ultimately 
changed his mind and urged the trial court to give a curative statement: 
[W]e would like the Court to make a statement to the jurors such as you 
suggested before about the reading of rights and indicating that sometimes 
officers will check with a person and see if one of the officers have, have 
read the rights or not to, to have that information before they do that, or, 
you put it in [sic] a lot better tha[n] I did. 
(Rl90:235), add. E. Because the trial court's statement provided a reasonable alternative 
explanation for the officer's question whether defendant had been previously given his 
Miranda rights, the well-crafted statement cured any possible negative inference jurors 
might have drawn from the testimony. 
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This Court will "generally presume that a jury will follow the instructions given 
it." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). 
Defendant does not claim, nor does the record indicate, that the possibility of any prior 
Miranda warning was further referenced or emphasized at trial. Moreover, defendant 
points to nothing in the record demonstrating that the trial court's curative instruction was 
ineffective. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 1998). In other words, even 
assuming the jury heard Officer Evans's testimony arguably suggesting defendant had 
been given Miranda warnings in a prior unrelated case, the testimony was not so 
devastating or prejudicial as to vitiate the mitigating effect of the trial court's instruction 
giving the jurors another explanation. Id. See State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 50, 27 P.3d 
1115 (holding trial court's curative instructions "were sufficient to dispel any prejudice 
occasioned by the improper statement"). 
POINT HI 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED AS UNRELIABLE 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE THAT A DEFENSE WITNESS HEARD 
ANOTHER ESSENTIALLY UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL CLAIM 
THE BLACK BAG APPROXIMATELY ONE AND ONE-HALF 
HOURS AFTER DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION AND ARREST 
In Point III of his brief, defendant claims the trial court erred in excluding as 
unreliable hearsay, evidence that defendant's sole witness, Sonya Ortiz, heard another 
individual claim ownership of the black bag approximately one and one/half hours after 
defendant's admission and arrest. Aplt. Br. at 37-43 {see Rl 91:302) (copies of the 
pertinent transcript pages are contained in addendum F). Specifically, defendant claims 
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Ortiz's testimony was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule 
because the individual she overheard "made the admission while under the stress of 
excitement caused by discovery that his bag of contraband was missing." Aplt. Br. at 37. 
Defendant's claim lacks merit and should be rejected. 
Proceedings Below. Defense witness Ortiz was one of the people present at the 
picnic table at the time of defendant's arrest (R191:271-304) (copies of the pertinent 
transcript pages are contained in addendum F). According to Ortiz, another individual 
known to her only as "Clay," was present when Officers Dimond and Evans initially 
approached the picnic table, but immediately left the area (Rl91:276, 281, 288), add. F. 
According to Ortiz, "Clay" returned about one and one/half hours after defendant's arrest 
and was "angry,""yelling and swearing" (R191:282, 286-287), add. F. Upon objection 
from the prosecutor, the trial court precluded Ortiz from testifying that "Clay" stated, 
"The bag was mine. That stuff was mine" (R191:296), add. F. 
The trial court rejected defendant's claim that the out-of-court declaration was 
admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule (R191:283, 290-306), 
add. F. In so ruling, the trial court found the alleged declaration was not precipitated by a 
startling event, was not spontaneous (R191:301), add. F. The trial court further found 
that the alleged declaration was not inherently reliable because so little was known about 
"Clay" (R), add. F. (R191:301-305), add. F. 
Analysis on Appeal. "The generally accepted rationale for the [excited utterance] 
exception is that declarations made during a state of excitement temporarily still a 
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startling event. Aplt. Br. at 37-41. Rather, defendant claims the trial court refused to 
admit the out-of-court declaration because little more was known about "Clay" than his 
first name, the lack of notice to the State. Id. Defendant thus claims that the trial court's 
ruling is "fundamentally unsound because it is based upon factors that do not play a role 
in evaluating the admissibility of excited utterance evidence." Aplt. Br. at 41. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court's observations as to the questionable 
reliability of the purported out-of-court declaration are pertinent and relevant. Indeed, 
"[t]he pivotal issue for an excited utterance is reliability." Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 69. Here, 
defendant did not attempt to hale "Clay" into court, and while his apparent unavailability 
would not necessarily preclude admission of the out-of-court declaration, it did preclude 
the trial court from evaluating "Clay's" age, and physical and mental ability. Smith, 909 
P.2d at 239-240. Indeed, all that is known about "Clay" comes from Ortiz, and she 
claimed only know his first name (Rl91:276, 281, 288), add. F. Defendant did not 
testify or introduce other evidence corroborative of "Clay's" alleged out-of-court 
declaration. As a result, the trial court was reasonably skeptical about "Clay's" existence, 
let alone his level of knowledge and excitement when he allegedly claimed ownership of 
the bag. EDWARD L. KIMBALL & RONALD N. BOYCE, UTAH EVIDENCE LAW, § 8-45 
(1996) (observing that it is not essential to know a declarant's identity, but trial courts 
will be skeptical about the knowledge and excitement of an unidentified declarant). 
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B. Even Assuming "Clay" Exists, The Trial Court Properly Found 
That no Startling Event Precipitated His Alleged Declaration, 
and That "Clay's" Declaration Was Not Spontaneous. 
Based on the above, the State remains skeptical that "Clay" even exists. However, 
contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court considered more than the questionable 
reliability of an out-of-court declaration by an essentially unknown individual, the trial 
court also found that "Clay's" alleged declaration was neither precipitated by a startling 
event, nor necessarily spontaneous (R191:301-305), add. F. These findings are well-
supported in the record and should be upheld. 
To qualify as "startling" for purposes of the excited utterance exception to the 
hearsay rule, an event must be so frightening or shocking as to "cause an excitement that 
stills normal reflective thought processes." Smith, 909 P.2d at 239, 240 n.2 (term 
"excitement" includes "any aroused emotional state that is likely to still reflective 
capacity, such as fear and shock"). In other words, the requisite startling event must be 
sufficient to produce "a high degree of emotional arousal." Id. (emphasis added). 
Here, the trial court properly recognized that the alleged "discovery" of the 
missing bag was not the type of highly emotional event contemplated by the excited 
utterance exception (Rl91:301-305), add. F. While defendant claims that courts have 
recognized a wide range of events as sufficiently startling, the events defendant cites are 
all arguably more exciting than the alleged "discover/' here. Indeed, they range the 
gamut from "police entry into home with battering ram," an extremely exciting event, to 
"bribe offer to juror," an arguably less exciting, yet illegal and thus arguably shocking 
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event. Aplt. Br. at 41 n.39 (citing cases). Cf. West Valley City v. Hutto, 2000 UT App 
188, 5 P.3d 1, If 13 (collecting cases with examples of statements blurted out in response 
to startling events including, "You're a dead man," "Daddy shot Mommy. Mommy is 
dead," "the son-of-bitch cut me"). 
Thus, even assuming arguendo "Clay" exists and that he made the out-of-court 
declaration, the trial court reasonably questioned why "Clay" did not take the bag with 
him when he walked away from the picnic table? (R191:306), add. F. The trial court's 
observation leads to the reasonable inference that "Clay" left the area without the bag 
when he saw the uniformed officers approach because he was concerned about his 
proximity to, and possible association with the bag and its illegal contents. Assuming 
"Clay" knew the bag held contraband, his departure further reasonably suggests he 
anticipated the officers may be interested in the bag, and, if they discovered its illegal 
content, may well seize it and arrest anyone associated with it. Given these unrebutted 
and abundantly reasonable inferences, the bag's removal or disappearance could have 
hardly surprised, let alone so shocked or frightened "Clay" as to still his reflective 
processes when he returned to the scene one and one-half hours after abandoning the bag. 
Smith, 909 P.2d at 238-240. 
For the same reasons "Clay's" alleged "discovery" does not amount to a highly 
emotional, shocking, frightening or otherwise startling event, the circumstances of this 
case do not necessarily demonstrate that "Clay's" alleged declaration of ownership was 
spontaneous. It is unknown where "Clay" went during the one and one-half hours 
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following the officers' seizure of the bag and defendant's confession - - "Clay" may well 
have observed these events and spent the time ruminating as to what he would say and 
how he would act upon his return to the scene after police departed with defendant {see 
R191:301-305),add.F. 
In sum, the most that can be said in defendant's favor is that, assuming "Clay" 
exists, his alleged declaration of ownership was related to the event at issue- -the police 
seizure of the black bag. Utah R. Evid. 803(2). However, defendant failed to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that "Clay's" alleged out-of-court 
declaration was also precipitated by a startling event and/or was spontaneous. Wetzel, 
868 P.2d at 69. Under the circumstances of this case, the police seizure of the bag and 
contraband therein was neither a frightening nor shocking event likely to highly arouse 
"Clay's" emotional state and still his reflective processes. The trial court's well-reasoned 
exclusion of this questionable hearsay evidence should thus be upheld. 
C. Any Arguable Error in Excluding "Clay's" Alleged Out-
of-Court Declaration Did Not Prejudice Defendant 
Even assuming the trial court exceeded its discretion in excluding "Clay's" 
questionable out-of-court declaration, any error was harmless. Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 69 
(citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)). Defendant's Mirandized 
admission that the bag and its contents belonged to him is much weightier than the out-of-
court declaration of an essentially unknown individual. The jury could reasonably have 
determined that if "Clay" truly knew the contents of the bag and/or was otherwise 
responsible for it, he would have taken it with him instead of risking its possible 
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discovery by the approaching officers. Moreover, defendant's clear admission that the 
bag belonged to him is otherwise unrebutted, i.e., defendant proffered no explanation as 
to why he claimed the bag and the marijuana inside if it did not belong to him.5 Further, 
at the time of his confession, defendant was no more associated with the bag and its 
contents than any of the other five individuals sitting on the picnic table. See, e.g., State 
v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985) ("[T]here must be sufficient nexus between the 
accused and drug to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and intent to 
exercise dominion and control"). Moreover, defendant's claim on appeal that he was 
worried about a drug dog sniffing drugs on him is undercut by the fact that no drugs were 
ultimately found on his person (see, e.g., 191:319). Thus, even if "Clay's" questionable 
out-of-court declaration had been admitted, there is no reasonable likelihood of a different 
outcome, given the incriminating evidence that defendant claimed ownership of the 
marijuana and admitted selling it because he could not find a job (R190:168), add. E. 
Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 69; Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240. 
5
 As set out in Point I of this brief, defendant's claim that his confession was 
coerced by the officers discussion about bringing a drug dog to the scene is not 
reviewable on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in a 
public park should be affirmed. 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; SEPTEMBER 1, 2000 
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, JUDGE PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Mr. Allred, if you'd sit with Ms. Remal. 
Mr. Allred, I just gave your attorney and the State some good 
news I think and that is that we had double set your case so 
you were sure you got to go. We set it for the 5th of 
September, which is Tuesday and we also set it for the 11th, 
the following week, thinking that one way or another you would 
be guaranteed a trial. Well, you can go either time because 
the other trial set for the 5th has pled out. What's your 
preference? 
MS. REMAL: What she's saying is that we have a choice 
between either of the dates and I've checked with everybody and 
everybody's schedule is such that it doesn't really much 
matter. Everybody can do it both days. So we could certainly 
do it on Tuesday and the complication that I told the Judge 
that I might possibly have, although probably won't, is that I 
have 
like 
another trial a 
I 
suppose 
THE 
MS. 
said I 
-
THE 
MS. 
COURT: 
REMAL: 
think 
COURT: 
REMAL: 
lso set on the 11th, 
But that's not an in--custody case? 
It is an in-custody case. Although, 
it's probably going to resolve. But I 
Is this an older case than that one? 
I don't think so. I think that one . 
I, 
is 
1 
1 I slightly older. They're both about the same time period, 
2 THE COURT: You're of the opinion the other one will 
3 resolve? 
4 MS. REMAL: Probably. Probably. And again our pre-
5 trial conference isn't until Friday and so you never know for 
6 sure until then. But I think -
7 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
8 MS. REMAL: - that's the likelihood. So, so Mr. 
9 Allred says let's do it the 5th and that -
10 THE COURT: That is your preference, Mr. Allred? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
12 THE COURT: Okay, the 5th it is. We'll have the 
13 defendant here at eight o'clock and we will ask that counsel be 
14 here at 8:30. All witnesses should be here by 8:30. 
15 MS. REMAL: And Your Honor, I have discussed with Ms. 
16 Ortez her schedule to find out if either of those dates matter 
17 to her. It's my best guess that probably we won't get to Ms. 
18 Ortiz until first thing after lunch. So my intention would be 
19 with regard to the Court to ask her to be here, say, I don't 
20 know, 1:15. 
21 THE COURT: That's fine. 
22 On the first day, Ms. Remal? 
23 MS. REMAL: You know, I really think it's possible we 
24 may complete the whole case in one day. I don't think -
25 THE COURT: All right, well, that's always possible. 
1 I It's pretty optimistic -
2 MS. REMAL: I understand, but I -
3 THE COURT: - with a jury, but we'll do our best. 
4 I I've done it before. Now you have a witness, counsel. Is your 
5 witness available on the 5th? 
6 MS. WISSLER: Yes. 
7 THE COURT: All right. I've taken an opportunity to 
8 read these Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
9 Suppress. I've also taken an opportunity to read the Motion to 
10 Suppress as well as the preliminary hearing transcript. Having 
11 said that, I believe I'm prepared to listen to the testimony 
12 and argument that you wish to make [inaudible] make. 
13 I MS. REMAL: Thank you, Your Honor. I think it makes 
14 sense to put the first thing to have Ms. Ortiz testify. 
15 THE COURT: Ms. Ortiz, do you want to come forward and 
16 we'll swear you in. 
17 MS. REMAL: She's just getting served with a subpoena 
18 for Tuesday, so let me make sure that that's done. 
19 J THE COURT: Okay, Ms. Ortiz, now that you've got that, 
20 can you come forward to be sworn? 
21 SONYA ORTIZ, 
22 having been first duly sworn, testified 
23 upon his oath as follows: 
24 THE COURT: Ms. Ortiz, what you're going to find is 
25 that the acoustics in here are not very good so I want you to 
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2 
3 
4 
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6 
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
lean into 
okay? 
the microphone and speak up as loudly as you can, 
MS. ORTIZ: Okay. 
i 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, can I ask the Court's 
permission to allow Mr. Allred to have one pen, a [inaudible] 
so that he can take notes. 
THE COURT: Yeah, certainly. 
MS. REMAL: [inaudible] material, thank you. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. REMAL: 
Q Sonya, would you state your full name and spell both 
your first and your last name for us? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
this year 
that day? 
A 
Q 
Okay, my name is Sonya Ortiz, S-O-N-Y-A O-R-T-I-Z. 
And Sonya, how old are you? 
I'm 17. 1 
And where do you live? 
On 1749 South 900 East. 
Okay, and is that in Salt Lake? 
Yes. 
Okay. Sonya, I want you to think back to June 9th of 
and ask you if you remember being in Liberty Park on 
Yes. 
And do you remember -
THE COURT: I'm sorry. 
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23 
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of 
on 
Q 
this 
that 
A 
Q 
MS. REMAL: I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: Repeat that please -
MS. REMAL: Sure -
! 
THE COURT: - I was trying to do two things. 
(BY MS. REMAL) I want you to think back to June 9th 
year and ask you if you remember being in Liberty Park 
day. 
Park that 
of 
A 
Q 
was 
A 
Q 
it 
yourself? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
generally 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Do you remember about what time you got to Liberty 
day? 
I'm not sure. 
Do you remember kind of the time of the day in terms 
morning, was it afternoon -
Late afternoon. 
Were you with anybody or with you, were you by 
I was with two of my friends. 
What are their names? 
Krystal and Megan. 
And did all three of you go together to the park? 
Yes. 
While you were there with your two friends, what 
were you doing? 
Just walking around. 
And at some point did you meet up with some guys 
5 
1 there? 
2 A Yeah. j 
3 Q What part of the park were you in when that happened? [ 
! 
4 A By the basketball courts. I 
5 Q And how many guys were there that you met up with, 
6 | with your friends? 
7 A There's at least five, maybe more. 
8 Q And I'll ask you to look around the courtroom here 
9 today. Do you recognize anybody in the courtroom as being one 
10 of those people you met up with that day? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q Can you point to that person and describe what that 
13 person's wearing? 
14 A The yellow jumpsuit. 
15 THE COURT: Okay, for the record, yeah, she's 
16 identified the Defendant. 
17 Q (BY MS. REMAL) Had you known this young man before 
18 that day? 
19 A No. 
20 Q Have you had any contact with him since that day? 
21 A No. 
22 Q Do you remember what his name is? 
23 A Tracy. 
24 Q And when you met up with these guys with, with your 
25 friends, what did all of you do? 
1 I A Just sit around and talk. 
2 Q At some point was there some contact you had with 
3 some police officers? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q And how long had you been talking with these guys 
6 before the police officers came up to you? 
7 A Oh, 15, 20 minutes. 
8 Q And were you near anything in particular when the, 
9 when the police officers came? 
10 A Hram. 
11 Q Were you sitting on anything, or by -
12 A A table. 
13 Q What kind of a table? 
14 A Like a picnic table. 
15 Q Were there benches or chairs of some sort by the 
16 table? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q And describe to me what you remember about the police 
19 coming up to you. 
20 A They had approached us and told us that they were, 
21 that they had a phone call and, and the phone call had told 
22 them that there was a drug deal that was going on. 
23 Q How many police officers were there? 
24 A Two. 
25 Q And were they in uniform or not in uniform? 
1 I A They were in uniform. 
2 Q Did you see whether they got out of a car of any 
3 sort, or vehicle of any kind? 
4 A A cop car. 
5 Q And was it a marked police car or a plain car? 
6 A A marked. 
7 Q And when the police officers came up to you, did one 
8 do all the talking or did they both talk to you at -
9 A They both did. 
10 Q Ifd ask you to look around the courtroom here today 
11 and see if you see either of those police officers here? 
12 A Right there. 
13 Q And can you -
14 THE COURT: I didn't hear that. What -
15 Q (BY MS. REMAL) Can you point to that person? 
16 THE COURT: And did you say anything before? 
17 A (BY MS. ORTIZ) I just said right there. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. And she had pointed to the 
19 gentlemen seated with Ms. Wissler. 
20 MS. REMAL: And, Your Honor, I believe that that's 
21 Officer Evans for the record. 
22 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
23 Q (BY MS. REMAL) Did you ever notice if there was any, 
24 any bags or packages or anything there near where you were? 
25 A There was a bag laying on, on the side of the table. 
1 j Q Can you remember what it looked like? 
2 A It was just a black bag. 
3 Q About how big was it would you say? 
4 A Probably like that big. I'm not -
5 Q So you're showing us with your hands, maybe about two 
6 and a half feet long? 
7 A Yeah. 
8 Q Something like that? And how wide do you think it 
9 was? 
10 I A Probably like that wide. I'm not sure. 
11 Q So maybe about six to nine inches wide, something 
12 like that? 
13 A Yeah. 
14 Q Did you notice if it had any handles or anything? 
15 A May have had a strap. 
16 Q Did you ever notice anybody, any of the guys or, or 
17 you, your friends touching it or doing anything with the bag? 
18 A No. 
19 I Q Did you learn the names of the other guys who you met 
20 there that day besides Tracy, can you remember? 
21 A Two or three I think. 
22 Q What do you remember their names? 
23 A Abdul was one. Quade, I can't remember any other 
24 ones. 
25 Q Now when the police officers got over to where you 
1 were, were all of these same people here, you and your friends 
2 J and the, at least five guys? 
3 I A No. There was like some of them left, like two or 
4 three or four of them left. 
5 Q Can you remember whether Tracy was one of the ones 
6 that left or was Tracy one of the ones that was still there? 
7 A No, he stayed. 
8 Q Can you remember the names of the people who left? 
9 A One of the ones that left was the one Quade. 
10 Q Do you remember when they left? Was it before the 
11 police officers came over or as the police officer came over or 
12 after the police officer -
13 A It was as the police officers approached us. 
14 Q And you indicated that when the police officers came 
15 over they said something about getting a phone call. What 
16 happened after that? 
17 A A phone call? 
18 Q Didn't, you indicated a minute ago that the police 
19 officer said they got a phone call about some drug deal. 
20 A Oh, yeah. 
21 Q What happened after that? 
22 A They asked if we had seen any drugs or anything of 
23 that sort. 
24 Q And, and were you all together when that was being 
25 J asked of you? 
10 
1 A Yeah. 
2 Q And what did everybody say? 
3 I A "We haven't seen anything like that." 
4 j Q And then what happened after that? 
5 A They saw the bag and they picked it up and asked who 
6 it belonged to. 
7 Q And did, did anybody answer to that question? 
8 A No. 
9 Q What happened? Did everyone just sit there, or, or 
10 what? 
11 A We told them that we didn't know whose it was. 
12 Q And so then what happened? 
13 A I think they searched the bag. 
14 Q And could you tell what was in the bag after they 
15 searched it? 
16 j A They took everything out. 
17 Q Where did they put it? 
18 A On the table. 
19 Q And so were you able to see the items they took out 
20 of the bag? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q What do you remember seeing was inside the bag? 
23 A Car stereos, screwdrivers, a bag of marijuana. 
24 Q And after they took the stuff out of the bag, what 
25 happened after that? 
11 
1 A They put it back in and asked us again if it had 
2 belonged to any of us. 
3 Q And what was, what was the answers that were given? 
4 A We still denied it belonging to us. 
5 Q Did any of the police officers ever talk to you or 
6 any of the other young people there separately instead of in a 
7 group? 
8 A Yeah, they questioned us individually. 
9 Q Describe how that happened. 
10 A They, they asked us who does that belong to again, 
11 and then they said that they'd like to question us individually 
12 and see -
13 Q And so did they ask you one by one to go someplace 
14 else? 
15 A Yeah. 
16 Q Where did you go? 
17 A By a tree that was a couple feet away. 
18 Q And -
19 THE COURT: That was what? 
20 THE WITNESS: That was a couple feet away. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 Q (BY MS. REMAL) And did you notice whether the police 
23 officers talked to each one of you young people separately? 
24 A Yes. 
25 J Q And were both police officers doing that, or was one 
12 
1 i police officer doing it? • 
I ! 
2 A Just one, and then the other one stayed with the | 
i 
3 group. I 
4 Q Was there ever a time that you tried to, to leave the 
5 location of the picnic table and go someplace else? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q What was, what happened then? 
8 A We asked if we can use the restroom. 
9 Q And who do you mean by we asked? 
10 A Me and my two friends. 
11 Q Your two girlfriends? 
12 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
13 Q And do you remember whether the police officers 
14 responded to that? 
15 A They told us that we couldn't leave until they got to 
16 the bottom. 
17 Q Do you remember which police officer said that, or 
18 was it both of them, or don't you remember? 
19 A It was both of them. 
20 Q Was there ever anything said about a police dog 
21 coming? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q When did, when was there some discussion about that? 
24 A After they had spoken to us all individually and 
25 still no one admitted the bags to belonging to us, they said 
13 
1 that they were going to bring in a dog and if any of us had any 
2 involvement with the bag that the dogs would be able to sense 
3 it. 
4 J MS. REMAL: I believe that's all the questions I have. 
5 Ms. Wissler might have some questions for you. 
6 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
7 MS. WISSLER: I just have a couple of questions. 
8 CROSS EXAMINATION 
9 BY MS. WISSLER: 
10 Q You indicated that the officers took each one of you 
11 aside and asked you some questions about this bag -
12 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
13 Q Is that right? 
14 A That's right. 
15 Q Did they put you in handcuffs when they did that? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Did they ever put you in handcuffs? 
18 A No. 
19 Q Okay. Did they take Tracy aside the same way they 
20 took the rest of you aside? 
21 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
22 Q And you watched them do that? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Okay. Did you ever see a dog that day? 
25 J A I think they brought it in the other car. 
14 
1 I Q Do you recall when you saw the dog, physically? 
2 A After they had handcuffed Tracy. 
3 MS. WISSLER: Okay, thanks, that's all I have. 
4 I THE COURT: May I ask a couple of follow-up? 
5 MS. REMAL: Surely. 
6 THE COURT: Did they ever take the dog out of the 
7 car? 
8 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: And what did they do with the dog? 
10 THE WITNESS: They just took the dog around the area 
11 of the basketball court and just let him sniff around. 
12 THE COURT: Were you present when anyone admitted that 
13 the black bag was theirs? 
14 THE WITNESS: No. 
15 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. I have nothing further. 
16 Any follow-up from either side? 
17 MS. WISSLER: No, Your Honor. 
18 MS. REMAL: No, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: All right, Ms. Ortiz, thank you for your 
20 assistance. You may stand down and we'll see you on Tuesday. 
21 MS. ORTIZ: Okay. 
22 MS. REMAL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
23 Now you say you [inaudible] come back to this same 
24 courtroom, but instead of coming in to the courtroom, just wait 
25 J outside in the hall, okay, and then when we're ready for you 
i 
i 
15 ! 
1 we'11 come out and get you and bring you in, okay? ' 
2 MS. ORTIZ: [inaudible]. j 
3 I MS. REMAL: And don't talk about the case with anybody! 
4 | [inaudible] there may be other witnesses standing outside, [ 
5 sitting -
6 THE COURT: Yeah, Ms. Ortiz, that's extremely 
7 important and I'm glad Ms. Remal brought it up. One of the 
8 rules in criminal cases is that we have an exclusionary rule, 
9 which means that no one who's a witness has the right to talk 
10 about the case with anyone else who's a witness, and the reason 
11 for that is so that your memory remains your memory and someone 
12 else's memory remains their's. You know how if you talk with a 
13 group of people after a while you can't remember who said what? 
14 Well what we like to do in a court of law is make sure that 
15 I people only speak of what they remember. So you should not 
16 I discuss this with the defendant, not with any other witnesses, 
17 including your girlfriends. The only one you would, ones you 
18 would want to discuss it with are the two attorney's, okay? 
19 I MS. ORTIZ: Okay. 
20 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
21 MS. REMAL: You might want to bring like a magazine or 
22 a book or something [inaudible] time. Even though we estimate 
23 [inaudible] okay? 
24 THE COURT: All right, any other witnesses Ms. Remal? 
25 I MS. REMAL: No, Your Honor. I do have, if the Court 
16 
1 will allow, a correction on one of the pages of the preliminary 
2 hearing transcript. I noticed when I was looking at it last 
3 night that one of the questions I'd asked, [inaudible] -
4 THE COURT: And what page are we on? 
5 MS. REMAL: Page 26, appeared to be incomplete and 
6 although I certainly sometimes ask incomplete questions -
7 THE COURT: Rarely. 
8 MS. REMAL: Right here, I've highlighted it for you so 
9 that -
10 THE COURT: Let's see, and that conversation between 
11 Mr. Allred and Officer Dimond about the dog, oh, occurred after 
12 the conversation between you and Officer Dimond about the dogs, 
13 do you accept that correction? 
14 MS. WISSLER: I do, Your Honor. I haven't reviewed 
15 the tape but I certainly -
16 MS. REMAL: And I have the tape here for you if you'd 
17 like to see that. 
18 MS. WISSLER: That's fine, [inaudible], not a 
19 problem. 
20 THE COURT: Let me change it on mine. Are there 
21 going to be any more witnesses? 
22 MS. WISSLER: No, Your Honor, we submit it on the 
23 (inaudible). 
24 THE COURT: Would you like to make argument? 
25 MS. REMAL: I would, Your Honor, [inaudible] — 
17 
1 THE COURT: All right. 
2 MS. REMAL: - would like to wait until I'm done to 
3 J respond. 
4 J THE COURT: One thing, so that I don't forget and I do 
5 want to hear from both of you if you wish to address this and 
6 I'll give you back your copy since I've corrected mine. I j 
7 appreciate that. I don't have any jury instructions or voir 
8 dire. Do you all happen to have them with you? 
9 MS. REMAL: No. 
10 THE COURT: Ladies, ladies, ladies, when can I expect 
11 these from you? 
12 MS. REMAL: Depends on how quickly we're done here. 
13 I can probably have them to you by five. 
14 THE COURT: Well I'll, I'll do this. I want them by 
15 eight o'clock on Tuesday and if you will do that for me, I 
16 won't make you do it tonight. But I want them at eight so that 
17 I can look them over and see what I will and will not allow and 
18 then I'm going to allow you both to do some of your own voir 
19 dire. What I will do is ask the stock and then let you have 
20 liberty to follow-up on any of the stocks and ask any of your 
21 own questions. 
22 I also want to know who the witnesses are going to be 
23 since we don't have witness lists or exhibit lists. Start with 
24 you if we could, Ms. Wissler. 
25 MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, I anticipate calling the 
18 
1 I officers involved. 
2 THE COURT: Give me their names. 
3 MS. WISSLER: Officer Dimond and Officer Evans, he's 
4 here today. I understand we do not have a stipulation as 
5 to the chain of custody so I need to call the chain of custody 
6 witnesses. 
7 THE COURT: And who are they? 
8 MS. WISSLER: That would be I believe Amy Despain -
9 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
10 MS. WISSLER: Bill Neves, and [inaudible] -
11 THE COURT: Wait, one more time, Bill? 
12 MS. WISSLER: I'm sorry, Bill Neves, N-E-V-E-S, and 
13 Ted [inaudible] from the crime lab and toxicologist. 
14 THE COURT: And who's the toxicologist? 
15 MS. WISSLER: Barbara Hopkins. 
16 THE COURT: Who? 
17 MS. WISSLER: Barbara Hopkins. 
18 THE COURT: Okay, anyone else? 
19 I MS. WISSLER: No, Your Honor, that's all I anticipate 
20 calling. 
21 THE COURT: Okay, and Ms. Remal? 
22 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I anticipate that we'll be 
23 calling Ms. Ortiz and we may or may not call Mr. Allred. We'll 
24 decide that as we progress. 
25 J THE COURT: Okay, and those are the only two 
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1 potential witnesses? 
2 MS. REMAL: I probably should list Dennis Couch. I 
3 don't anticipate calling him, but in the event that there's 
4 some last minute thing that I ask him to do and come and 
5 testify about. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. All right, now what about 
7 exhibits? 
8 MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, I only anticipate two 
9 exhibits, that being the black bag that we discussed and the 
10 contents, being the marijuana. I'm not interested in the car 
11 stereos. 
12 THE COURT: All right, so you're going to present I 
13 assume as initially one exhibit, marked one, and then when you 
14 remove any pieces or parts from it, you would have them 
15 separately marked. 
16 MS. WISSLER: Right. 
17 THE COURT: And then what about the tox report? 
18 MS. WISSLER: That also. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's helpful, and 
20 now I'm happy to hear your arguments. 
21 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, as I didn't have the 
22 preliminary hearing transcript yet at the time of the motion, 
23 if you think it would be helpful to Your Honor I've pinpointed 
24 pages and lines in the preliminary hearing transcript that I 
25 I think that are significant. 
20 
1 THE COURT: That's helpful. 
2 MS. REMAL: And, and let me go through those. It's 
3 clear that Officer Evans and Officer Dimond approached the 
4 J young people who were sitting at the picnic table in Liberty 
5 Park and we know that from the preliminary hearing Pages 2 and 
6 3. We know that later on a third officer, Officer Serrio I 
7 I believe is his name, came with a dog and that was way towards 
8 the end of the, the entire incident, preliminary hearing Page j 
9 11. The officers were in uniform, including guns, not drawn, 
10 but guns that are part of their uniform and were in marked ! 
I i 
11 police vehicles, that's at the preliminary hearing Page 12. I 
12 The officers questioned the young people there at the \ 
i 
13 picnic table about whether there was any drug activity, either | 
14 seen by them or that they participated in. They said that they' 
15 neither seen any or participated any, in any, that's 
16 I preliminary hearing Page 4. 
17 j Mr. Allred was frisked for weapons, that's at 
18 preliminary hearing Page 18. The young people were run for | 
I i 
19 warrants. That took five to ten minutes. That's at [ 
i 
! 
20 preliminary hearing Page 19. A bag was noticed near the table, ] 
21 sort of on the ground by the picnic table. That's at ' 
I 
22 preliminary hearing Page 5. The officers questioned the young | 
23 people about whether the bag was theirs. They all said no. j 
i 
t 
24 That's at preliminary hearing Page 6. I 
25 j The officers looked inside the bag and saw items, | 
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1 including the green leafy substance, which ultimately was 
2 I determined to be marijuana. That's at preliminary hearing Page 
3 6. 
4 The officers pulled each of the six aside by Officer 
5 Evans' prelim testimony, 10 to 15 feet from the others, to 
6 question them individually about the bag and ownership of the 
7 bag. That's at preliminary hearing Page 21. 
8 Each of the young people were questioned individually 
9 about the ownership of the bag. That's also preliminary 
10 hearing Page 21. 
11 Officer Evans testified at the preliminary hearing 
12 that in his view each of the young people were free to leave. 
13 That's at preliminary hearing Page 21 and onto Page 22. 
14 There was a discussion between Officer Evans and 
15 Officer Dimond regarding bringing a drug sniffing dog to the, 
16 the scene there, to come down and sniff out who the bag 
17 belonged to. That's at preliminary hearing Page 24 and 25. 
18 One of the officers mentioned that they have canine, 
19 canine dogs which are mean. That's at preliminary hearing Page 
20 25. 
21 Officer Evans indicated to Officer Dimond in front of 
22 the six young people that there was a dog that was used in the 
23 County who had bitten someone's back side. That was at 
24 preliminary hearing Page 25. 
25 That it was after the discussion about the dogs that 
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1 I Mr* Allred for the first time admitted to Officer Dimond that 
2 the bag was his and there may have been more discussion, 
3 according to Officer Evans, about the dogs after that statement 
4 I was made. That's at preliminary hearing Page 25 and on to Page 
5 26, and Officer Evans himself Mirandized Mr. Allred after Mr. 
6 Allred had already made the statement to Officer Dimond about 
7 the bag being his and that's at preliminary hearing Page 28. 
8 Your Honor, my Motion itself was perhaps not as clear 
9 I as it ought to have been and so I'm hoping I can make that 
10 clearer today. There are actually two separate statements made 
11 by Mr. Allred to the police officers as I understand it. One 
12 was made to Officer Dimond, that's the first statement that was 
13 made and then there was a second statement that was made by Mr". 
14 Allred to Officer Evans. The testimony at the preliminary 
15 hearing indicates that, as far as I can tell, the statement to 
16 I Officer Dimond was done without benefit of a Miranda warning 
17 I being given, but certainly the statement made subsequent to 
18 that by Officer Evans was after Miranda warnings were given. 
19 I In my view, Your Honor, the first statement by Mr. 
20 Allred, and that's the one to Officer Dimond, ought to be 
21 suppressed because in my view it was a custodial interrogation 
22 and there was no Miranda given. 
23 THE COURT: What exactly was said at that time, just 
24 that the bag was his? 
25 MS. REMAL: The bag was his, yes, that's my 
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1 understanding, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: All right, now how do you, what is your 
3 perception as to how you establish that he's in custody? 
4 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, -
5 THE COURT: He was not totally under arrest, as I 
6 understand it and he's not in cuffs. 
7 MS. REMAL: That's correct, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: And -
9 MS. REMAL: - those two things are, are correct. 
10 THE COURT: - my understanding is they were free to 
11 leave. 
12 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, as the, the, both the State's 
13 Memo and my motion indicate, State, Salt Lake City v. earner 
14 has indicated that there are four factors the Court should look 
15 at in determining that. The site of the interrogation, whether 
16 the investigation is focused on a particular person, whether 
17 the objective indicia of arrest are present and the length and 
18 form of the interrogation. 
19 Certainly the site of the interrogation being at the 
20 park is not something that indicates necessarily that Mr. 
21 Allred was in custody/ as it would for instance if it were in a 
22 jail or, or police department. Whether or not the 
23 investigation focused on Mr. Allred, it appears to me that it 
24 focused on each of them at the time that they were questioned 
25 J individually, and although that focus shifted from person to 
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1 I person, certainly at the time that Mr. Allred was being 
2 individually questioned it was focused on him. 
3 The length and form of interrogation, in my view, 
4 ' Your Honor, it's certainly not an extremely rapid situation, 
5 because we know that from start to finish there was time enough 
6 for them to be frisked, for there to be a discussion about 
7 whether or not there was drug activity observed or participated 
8 in, there was a warrants check that took five to ten minutes, 
9 I there was then the questioning of the individuals in the group 
10 about the bag and the contents, then there was the individual 
11 questioning of all of them. 
12 THE COURT: Did anyone ever suggest though with 
13 specificity how long it took? 
14 I MS. REMAL: Not to my recollection, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 J MS. REMAL: The only time frame that I recall is that 
17 I Officer Evans testifying that the warrants check itself he 
18 believes took between five and ten minutes. 
19 J The form of the interrogation, Your Honor, in my 
20 view, took two forms. It was both direct questioning and was 
21 what I believe is the functional equivalent of questioning. 
22 Certainly there was the direct questioning, "Is this bag yours, 
23 I who's bag is this, who's stuff is this in the bag," and in my 
24 view, Your Honor, the discussion by the two officers in front 
25 of the individuals about the dog, about there being a mean dog, 
25 
1 I about did you remember about that dog who bit somebody, is the 
2 functional equivalent of questioning in combination with a 
3 I suggestion to the individuals that if somebody doesn't own up 
4 j to the bag, they're going to bring the dog, some of the dogs 
5 are mean and we know that dogs sometimes bite people and so in 
6 my view -
7 THE COURT: So you're saying that's coercion? 
8 MS. REMAL: I'm saying that that's coercive, Your 
9 Honor. 
10 In regards to the objective indicia of arrest 
11 present, certainly it's true handcuffs were not used. It's 
12 true that, that as far as I know the words you're under arrest 
13 were not, were not spoken during the time of the questioning. 
14 But in my view, Your Honor, there are other indicia of arrest 
15 or custody. The officers were in uniform. They were in a 
16 marked police vehicle and had guns as part of the uniform, 
17 although there's no suggestion that they were drawn or pointed, 
18 THE COURT: I think there was a comment, you correct 
19 if I'm wrong, in the preliminary hearing transcript that the 
20 officers or one of the officers had essentially made a 
21 determination that this was not a problematic scenario, that 
22 there were no drugs, was ready to let them all go when the 
23 I black bag was spotted. 
24 MS. REMAL: That, I believe you're accurate about 
25 that being the testimony. 
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1 I THE COURT: So what do you, at a certain point in 
2 time when the questioning began, there was a free [inaudible] -
3 MS. REMAL: Well, Your Honor, I, this is -
4 THE COURT: Arguably. 
5 MS. REMAL: - why I wanted the Court to hear Ms. 
6 Ortiz' testimony. So that you could hear her testimony about 
7 the fact that she and her girlfriends asked to use the restroom 
8 and, and were told by the officers they were not allowed to 
9 leave and go to the restroom until they got to the bottom of 
10 this and so I believe that that's an important indicia that in 
11 fact the young people were not free to leave because they 
12 specifically asked and were denied permission to do that. 
13 Your Honor, I think other indicia of, another indicia 
14 of arrest or custody is the separation of each of the young 
15 people from the others to be questioned individually and the 
16 fact that that separation occurred by moving them physically 
17 from the location of the picnic table where the other kids were 
18 over to someplace else could be questioned by an officer out of 
19 the hearing on the others. So in my view, Your Honor, when you 
20 put all those indicia together, it does indicate custodial 
21 situation. 
22 Your Honor, in regards to the statement to Officer 
23 Evans, clearly that was an in-custody statement. At that time 
24 Mr. Allred was handcuffed and sitting on the picnic table 
25 J according to Officer Evans' testimony. So I don't think that's 
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1 a question. Certainly there was Miranda given at that time. 
2 I Officer Evans testified at the preliminary hearing that he did 
3 so prior to questioning Mr. Allred, but that that questioning 
4 I took place right after Mr. Allred had made his statement to 
5 Officer Dimond and admitted the bag was his. 
6 In my view, Your Honor, that then puts us in a 
7 situation where the Court has to make a determination, well, 
8 first the Court has to make a determination if it's problematic 
9 that Miranda was not given during the questioning by Officer 
10 Dimond. 
11 THE COURT: Which, of course, turns on whether or not 
12 there was a custodial situation. 
13 MS. REMAL: Correct, correct. 
14 THE COURT: And I can't see, although I understand 
15 your point about the young woman and the restroom, I can't see 
16 that it was custodial. In fact, to me the preliminary hearing 
17 appears to have concluded or the testimony se€»ms to have 
18 indicated that the officers were leaning toward releasing the 
19 whole group of people at the point in time just before the 
20 defendant acknowledged that the bag was his. It's a tough one, 
21 because as you say the young woman asked to use the restroom 
22 and they said not til we get to the bottom of this. That to me 
23 doesn't mean she can't leave. What it means is that they're 
24 trying to control a group of people and keep them perhaps from 
25 J talking to one another and don't want them sort of out of their 
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1 j sight. But it isn't the same as putting them in custody and 
2 forbidding them to leave the vicinity. So I can't really find, 
3 I unless there's more that I've missed, that the first statement 
4 j was custodial. Obviously, one would have liked there to have ; 
5 been a Miranda warning given immediately and for the young 
6 woman to have been taken to the restroom if they were worried 
7 about conversation, were allowed to.go to the restroom. But my 
8 concern about that is not that great. 
9 Let me ask you this, what was said after Miranda to 
10 Detective Evans? 
11 MS. REMAL: Let me point you to the part of the 
12 transcript that, what was said to my recollection, Your Honor, 
13 is that Mr. Allred stated that the bag was his and that he had 
14 been selling marijuana in the park for the last couple of 
15 months because he'd been unable to find employment. Your 
16 Honor, on Page 27 of the preliminary hearing transcript, Ms. 
17 Wissler was asking Officer Evans about that conversation and 
18 Officer Evans indicated that he had, Mr. Allred had admitted 
19 the bag was his, that he admitted that it was marijuana, that 
20 the green leafy substance was marijuana and that he'd been 
21 selling marijuana because he was unable to get a job. 
22 THE COURT: All right, so what is your position 
23 concerning, what if I keep out the first statement, the no bag, 
24 I or the bag is mine and don't allow any reference to that first 
25 reference to the bag? He wasn't mirandized. One could argue 
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1 that he was in custody and only allow in what comes after 
2 Miranda. 
3 MS. REMAL: And, Your Honor, my argument about, about 
4 that second statement by Mr. Allred to Officer Evans after 
5 Miranda is that, that the Court is then in a position where you 
6 have to make a determination whether or not the second 
7 statement was an exploitation of the prior improper statement 
8 because it wasn't mirandized and I think that there are cases 
9 such as State versus Arroyo and State versus Allen, which talk 
10 about if there's a prior police misconduct or illegality and 
11 then something else that happens afterwards the Court has to 
12 make a decision about whether there's enough attenuation to 
13 essentially purge the taint of that initial -
14 THE COURT: We've got two different officers 
15 involved. 
16 MS. REMAL: Right. 
17 THE COURT: We don't have the same officer. We don't 
18 have the officer, as I recall and I could be wrong, saying I 
19 understand you just said the bag was yours. It sort of 
20 starts a fresh, as I recall. And you're in a park, which never 
21 changes. You're not taken to police headquarters. You're not 
22 even put in a patrol car. While it's not clear exactly how 
23 long this took, it doesn't appear to have been inordinately 
24 long from what Ms. Ortiz said or from the preliminary hearing 
25 transcript. The focus was not on the defendant until he had 
30 
1 j acknowledged the bag was his. 
2 There are, as far as I can tell, no indicia of arrest 
3 | except certainly the defendant was under arrest when he was 
4 j told he's under arrest and the cuffs were put on. Before that 
5 j the only thing you've got is Ms. Ortiz' limitation on using the, 
6 I restroom, and I guess my question on that would be Liberty ; 
7 I Park's pretty big and there are a lot of different restrooms j 
I i 
8 and I'd be interested in where the restroom was in relation to 
9 where she was. ! 
i 
i 
10 j I'll tell you what troubles me, frankly, is this j 
11 reference to the dog. I think this is coercive, or potentially1 
12 coercive and I don't like it at all, and was that after the
 ( 
13 Miranda? 
14 MS. REMAL: The, the discussion about the dogs was, 
15 as I understand it, prior to both statements Mr. Allred made. 
16 I Prior to the statement to Officer Dimond and, and also prior to 
17 the statement to Officer Evans. There appears that there was 
18 discussion both before and after the statements, but certainly 
19 some of it was before. 
20 THE COURT: And I wouldn't have any problem with an 
21 I officer saying, you know, we have dogs that can sniff out 
22 marijuana. If there's more marijuana around here we may bring 
23 them out. But to suggest that the dog can bite someone and do 
24 J damage and harm someone is frankly problematic. I think it's 
25 poor police work. 
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1 MS- REMAL: And, Your Honor, that -
2 THE COURT: Potentially coercive. 
3 MS. REMAL: That, that's the basis of my argument, 
4 which is really separate from the Miranda that Mr. Allred's 
5 statement was not voluntarily given, but rather given as a 
6 product of the fact that he'd been told about, they'd all been 
7 told about these dogs potentially being brought or a dog 
8 potentially being brought, that at least some of the dogs that 
9 are police dogs are mean and there's been an instance at least 
10 once where someone's been bitten during the process of sniffing 
11 them out. And in my view that's the very kind of coercion that 
12 makes a statement involuntary. 
13 And just so the record is clear, and I understand 
14 what the Court's feeling is about the statement that Mr. Allred 
15 gave to Officer Dimond, but just for the record, my argument 
16 about Officer Evans' Mirandized statement is that it's, it's 
17 not attenuated enough from the initial Officer Dimond statement 
18 and therefore it can't be used either. 
19 THE COURT: [inaudible] 
20 MS. REMAL: Just [inaudible] -
21 THE COURT: Let me ask you this, is there a discussion 
22 between Officer Allred [sic] and Officer Dimond about the first 
23 statement before the second statement is made after Miranda? 
24 MS. REMAL: It was my understanding from the 
25 I preliminary-hearing that although Officer Evans wasn't part of 
32 
1 i that conversation and didn't overhear it that he understood 
2 that a confession had been made and that's why they had 
3 arrested Mr. Allred, that Mr. Allred was already under arrest 
4 I at the time that Officer Evans spoke to him. 
5 THE COURT: Okay, did you wish to say anything else? 
6 MS. REMAL: No, Your Honor, I think, I think the 
7 Court understands my argument. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 Counsel? 
10 MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, I'll be brief. I don't know 
11 whether Your Honor received a copy of the memorandum I filed 
12 [inaudible] I have -
13 THE COURT: No, but I -
14 MS. WISSLER: - [inaudible] this morning and I 
15 apologize for the lateness. 
16 I THE COURT: Yes, I did get that, I've read that. 
17 j MS. WISSLER: So I won't recite what's written in the 
18 memorandum. But what I would like to say about the coercion 
19 aspect that's been alleged in this case is two things, and 
20 that's first of all, and I think most importantly is there was 
21 no dog present at the scene of this incident until after Mr. 
22 Allred was in handcuffs and was safely in a patrol car. The 
23 dog was not removed from the car until that time and that's by 
24 the testimony of the witness that testified here as well today. 
25 It isn't as if this dog was pulling on the end of the rope, 
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1 I gnashing his teeth and barking at the time that Mr. Allred made 
2 his confession. 
3 J THE COURT: That's true. 
4 MS. WISSLER: And I would further indicate to the 
5 Court -
6 THE COURT: That's true. 
7 MS. WISSLER: - that upon questioning today, Ms. 
8 Ortiz indicated that she recalled the officer saying that if 
9 they had any involvement in this marijuana the dog would be 
10 able to sniff it out. She made no reference today to any 
11 comment about the dog biting anyone and what's important about 
12 that, Your Honor, is certainly not to suggest that that comment 
13 didn't occur, but rather to suggest that it apparently didn't 
14 have much of an impact on Ms. Ortiz because she didn't even 
15 testify about it here in Court today. What she said in Court 
16 today was that they told her that they were, that they could 
17 bring in the dog and that if any of these individuals had any 
18 association with this bag the dog would be able to sense it. 
19 THE COURT: Well they went -
20 MS. WISSLER: She made no comment about it at all. 
21 THE COURT: - farther than that according to the 
22 preliminary hearing transcript. 
23 MS. WISSLER: And I agree with the Court. What I, 
24 what I, and I don't, I don't mean to infer that that comment 
25 I did not take place, because I believe it did. 
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1 j THE COURT: But she did not [inaudible] -
2 MS. WISSLER: But she did not apparently feel that it 
3 was noteworthy or take - or feel that it, it apparently didn't 
4 stick in her mind that there was a comment made about the dogs 
5 biting someone. And so that's why I believe that under these 
6 circumstances this conversation did not play a large part in 
7 the statements that were made by Mr. Allred. I think that the 
8 memorandum that I filed pretty specifically addresses the 
9 issues of the custody status, or lack thereof, with regards to 
10 the first statement and also the issue of the subsequent 
11 Mirandized statement and so I won't, I won't say too much. I 
12 simply want to point out those two things which I think are 
13 important to the Court. 
14 THE COURT: Do you see any problem with the coercive 
15 aspects of the dog, or the reference to the dog? I agree with 
16 you the dog was not taken out, so I guess it's in some ways 
17 commensurate with a gun that's in the holster and never 
18 brandished or used, except that if one were to say look at this 
19 gun I've got. Look at this gun I've got, and I can take it out 
20 any time I want and I've shot people with it, that puts it in a 
21 whole different situation. What they said here was we can get 
22 a dog and that maybe we can get a certain dog by a certain name 
23 because he's really a mean one, something like that indicating 
24 that there are different dogs and some of them are meaner than 
25 J others and so even though the dog was not there at the time, 
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1 reference to the dog troubles me. 
2 MS. WISSLER: And Your Honor, I, I, to be quite candid 
3 j with the Court, I've told the officers involved in this case 
4 that I would have preferred had this conversation not taken 
5 place. But I, because this type of situation arises where 
6 these kind of conversations happen. I don't think, however, I 
7 discussed this case that there is any indication but for this 
8 essentially their claims of coercion. There was no, there was 
9 no implicit threat. There was no "if you don't own up to this, 
10 this dog's gonna bite you." There was no dog present. 
11 THE COURT: Well, I may be disagreeing with you on 
12 that one. I just wonder if that's sufficient to make it 
13 coercive. Because as you point out the dog was not there. 
14 There's another statement, now I'm looking at Page 
15 25, "I did mention to Officer Dimond about, well, let's see, 
16 yeah I think I mentioned it to him that in the County I had 
17 backed the County officer and their dog found drugs in the back 
18 side of someone. I guess he put it down his pants and the dog 
19 had found it, was sniffing at his back side." Now the only 
20 reason to go into this nonsense about a dog nipping at 
21 somebody's posterior and a dog being mean and looking for a 
22 mean dog and asking for a certain dog by name is coercive. 
23 MS. WISSLER: Well and there was actually -
24 THE COURT: Because drugs had already been found. 
25 MS. WISSLER: There was actually not a discussion 
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1 about one dog being meaner than the other. 
2 THE COURT: Well now, it was just what I read a 
3 moment ago. 
4 MS. WISSLER: Right, and I agree with you. 
5 THE COURT: I'm on Page 24. 
6 MS. WISSLER: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
7 THE COURT: "'And did you say something to Officer 
8 Dimond or did Officer Dimond say something to you about yeah 
9 maybe we should get a certain dog by a certain name, he's 
10 really a mean one, something like that indicating that there 
11 are different dogs and some of them are meaner?" 
12 He says, "Well at first we thought about a canine 
13 dog, a regular canine dog which sniffs at a, and then we 
14 decided the bloodhound, which we recently got on the police 
15 department would be better, because he could go off scent and 
16 be able to point out which person." So I guess it's 
17 questionable whether there was a reference to meaner. 
18 MS. WISSLER: And I think that, it's important that 
19 you note that, Your Honor, because that's the kind of dog that 
20 actually appeared on the scene was a -
21 THE COURT: [inaudible] a canine — 
22 MS. WISSLER: Not a drug dog. 
23 THE COURT: All right. 
24 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, may I just point out-
25 THE COURT: Surely. 
1 I MS. REMAL: - another statement in that, on that same 
2 J Page 25, line 9, the question I had asked is do you, "Did you 
3 or Officer Dimond say something about one dog being meaner than 
4 another? And the answer was "Probably, I think someone did say 
5 something. I can't remember if it was me or him that said 
6 we've got the canine dogs and they are mean." 
7 MRS. WISSLER: But that wasn't the kind of dog that 
8 they were discussing bringing. 
9 THE COURT: Yes, I understand. It would be nice had 
10 that not been said. It would make it such a cleaner case, so 
11 much of a cleaner case. I don't think we live in a society 
12 where we need to threaten people. I'm going to consider this 
13 and if we're going to trial on the 11th I have plenty of time 
14 to give you an indication of where I stand on this. I'm 
15 telling you, this is not one of those cases where I'm 
16 necessarily going to rule that it's not suppressible. I have 
17 not determined that it is suppressible, but frankly it's on the 
18 line. I don't like the way this is handled, and, you know, 
19 I've spent time in Liberty Park myself. I roller blade there. 
20 I bike there. I take my daughter there. We picnic there, and 
21 if officers had come up to me and had started asking me 
22 questions and threaten me with a dog and gone through my 
23 personal effects, even though they would not have found drugs, 
24 it's kind of a terrifying thing to contemplate and I'm not so 
25 sure that the manner in which this is handled is guaranteed to 
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1 get to the truth in a fair and appropriate manner. I'm going 
2 to think about it. 
3 Let me ask one more question and you may not know the 
4 answer to this. Where was the restroom that the young woman 
5 wanted to use in relation to where the picnic table was? 
6 MS. REMAL: I didn't ask that question at the 
7 preliminary hearing, so I don't know. 
8 THE COURT: Do you know? 
9 MS. REMAL: Mr. Allred, I think -
10 THE COURT: Mr. Allred? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: It was about from where, from where 
12 the basketball court is, when you enter, the basketball court, 
13 they've got some out, outlet restrooms and they're just about 
14 25 yards,, maybe not even that far. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Well I'm going to give this 
16 considerable thought. Now I don't know if that changes your 
17 decision about going on the 11th, because you're not going to 
18 know what my ruling is until you come in on the 5th. I mean 
19 I'd be happy to tell you sooner, but we won't be here. So does 
20 that change your position on that? 
21 MS. REMAL: It certainly makes probably more sense for 
22 us to get the Court's ruling before we proceed, and again my 
23 only hesitation is -
24 THE COURT: I'll tell you right now, the first 
25 J statement is not coming in. The statement to Officer Dimond 
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1 without the Miranda, this bag is mine, is not coming in. So if 
2 what we're talking about now is whether the second statement 
3 comes in and so that raises questions whether the first 
4 statement came, the second statement and as I recall the law on 
5 this, there has to be a significant passage of time between the 
6 two. They have to be sufficiently attenuated so that there 
7 isn't a taint and I'm not sure we've got that. So why don't 
8 you visit for a minute with your client. 
9 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, do you have any sense of if 
10 the worse happens and on the 11th my other case doesn't resolve 
11 as I think it likely will, when the date would be after that? 
12 THE COURT: Well, I would guarantee because the 
13 defendant is in custody that I'd get it on immediately. 
14 [inaudible] here. 
15 If we could not try this because Ms. Remal is in 
16 front of Judge Hansen on the 11th, could we do this on the 
17 18th? 
18 COURT CLERK: We [inaudible] 
19 THE COURT: Okay, what about the 20th? Why couldn't 
20 we do it on the 20th? 
21 COURT CLERK: [inaudible] 
22 THE COURT: What about the 25th? 
23 COURT CLERK: We could do it then. 
24 THE COURT: We could do it the 25th. So we're in the 
25 I same month, we're just a few weeks away. 
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1 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, let me say back to you what I 
2 think I hear you saying, and that is that you think that this 
3 is an important question that you feel like you need time to ! 
4 consider it carefully. 
5 THE COURT: I'll go further. I'll say that I think 
6 there is a good chance that if I allow any second statement j 
7 it'll be overturned on appeal and that's not my concern. My 
8 concern is in doing the right thing. But what I mean by 
9 referencing an appeal is that I think the case law, and I want 
10 to re-read everything and I want to look very closely at Ms. 
11 Wissler's Memorandum that she's directly on point on a number 
12 of these issues, I'm really concerned about the manner in which 
13 this was handled and I think you know me well enough to know 
14 that I don't usually say that. I usually say it's suppressed 
15 or it's not suppressed. This is one I have not made up my mind 
16 on, but there is a very good chance that it will be suppressed. 
17 MS. REMAL: I guess my comment has to do with the 
18 amount of time that you feel like you need to properly consider 
19 it. It seems like what you're saying is that -
20 THE COURT: If the trial goes on Tuesday, then I will 
21 do it over the weekend. I'll give it the time it deserves, 
22 whether it's my own time or time in the office here. But I 
23 think it's an important issue and what I'd like to do, frankly, 
24 is not only research it myself and look at it, but also have my 
25 j law clerk look at it too, because I think it's an important 
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I 
1 I issue and that's not going to happen if we go to trial Tuesday. 
2 Ms. Wissler, let me ask you a question and perhaps 
3 you could turn to the officer and ask him. What is your 
4 understanding of the time differential between Officer Dimond's 
5 questioning of the defendant and Officer Evans Miranda and 
6 questioning of the Defendant? 
7 MS. WISSLER: I don't know, let me ask. 
8 I MS. REMAL: Your Honor, what I've indicated to Mr. 
9 Allred is that I want the Court to have the time to do the 
10 research and consider the question carefully, and because of 
11 that it's my advice to him that he agree to the 11th date and 
12 if my other case doesn't go away like I think it's likely too, 
13 that we agree to the date on the 25th. 
14 THE COURT: We'll write this down in pencil on both 
15 days. But he's assured of one date or the other if it isn't 
16 resolved on the, on the motion, and frankly, I feel better 
17 about that. I think it's more likely I'll make the correct 
18 decision. While you were visiting with your client I put a 
19 question to Ms. Wissler. I asked that she confer with her 
20 officer if she wished to. I wanted to know what the time 
21 differential between conversation A and conversation B with the 
22 Miranda was. 
23 Recognizing that it's hard to pinpoint these things, 
24 do you have an approximate time? 
25 I MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, the officer indicated that 
42 
he thinks it was between 15 and 20 minutes- He indicated to me 
the things that he did in between the time that Mr. Allred was 
taken in custody and when he approached him again and had 
mirandized him and then had the rest of that conversation and, 
and he says he recalls it was between 15 to 20 minutes. 
THE COURT: Okay, and that was without having talked 
to his colleague? 
MS. WISSLER: He indicated to me just now that he 
went and talked to the third officer who had by then arrived 
and they were having some discussion, and -
THE COURT: So he talked to the officer with the dog, 
but did he talk to Officer Dimond? 
MS. WISSLER: He indicates, Your Honor, that the 
conversation he had with Officer Dimond regarded what was in 
the bag, in terms of quantity -
[over talking] 
THE COURT: So he didn't say what the defendant had 
said to him as you recall, he just said I found marijuana in 
the bag and then went and visited with the officer with the 
dog, 15 to 20 minutes passes and he had the conversation with 
the defendant? 
MS. WISSLER: Right. 
THE COURT: All right, well, Ifm going to carefully 
consider this and research the issue. I don't think it's an 
easy issue. You know, I understand that law enforcement 
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1 officers, even the very best ones, in circumstances where 
2 they're trying to find out information that's important may use 
3 a word or a phrase that when we look at in hindsight in the 
4 Court seems very different. So I'm not faulting the officers, 
5 but I am saying I certainly wish the reference to the dog and 
6 the dog's personality had not been made. That troubles me. 
7 I'm not as troubled about the lack of Miranda on the first 
8 statement. That's just out, and since the same stuff came in 
9 on the second statement, it's a question of whether the two 
10 were attenuated enough. It bodes well for the State that 
11 apparently the two officers that got the two statements didn't 
12 do much talking and that there's 15 minutes and so it is not a 
13 significant period of time. But there are a lot of issues and 
14 I don't know whether this is a product of coercion, but that 
15 certainly is a strong possibility. 
16 So I will take the time I need. In all likelihood I 
17 won't rule for a week. I'll probably have a ruling for you 
18 next Friday which means that I'll spend the weekend looking it 
19 over, reading the case law and then I'll meet with my law clerk 
20 on Tuesday and have her do some additional research and then 
21 we'll process it together and do some kind of memorandum or 
22 [inaudible]. 
23 MS. REMAL: Would it be helpful if we set this for 
24 pretrial Conference next Friday so that the Court can inform us 
25 I and then -
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1 THE COURT: Sure. 
2 MS, REMAL: - I'll by then hopefully know what's 
3 happening with my other case so we'll know -
4 THE COURT: I think that's a great idea. 
5 MS. REMAL: - what -
6 THE COURT: And you can tell us which of the trial 
7 dates you want to use if it's still looking like it's going to 
8 trial. 
9 MS. REMAL: Okay. 
10 THE COURT: And of course, what's going on with me 
11 and my thought processes, etc., does not in any way impede 
12 counsel visiting and arriving at an agreement. Okay, so next 
13 Friday, the 8th and if you're hear first Lisa, we'll do it 
14 first at 8:30 in the morning, assuming the jail brings up Mr, 
15 Allred in a timely manner, we'll let him be first. 
16 Any other issues we need to discuss today? 
17 MS. REMAL: I don't believe so. 
18 THE COURT: Well, I think that gives you an extension 
19 on your instructions, so you can have until Wednesday at five 
20 to get the instructions in. 
21 MS. REMAL: Okay. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
23 Thank you, sir. 
24 (Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 
25 
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! 
1 i SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; SEPTEMBER 8, 2000 
2 HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 | P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 J THE COURT: That and we'll do it. 
5 MS. REMAL: On the last page, number 1 -
6 THE COURT: And Tracy Allred is the one that we were 
7 going to -
8 Would you see if that's on my desk Michelle? That's 
9 the one I did some research on. 
10 MS. REMAL: Correct, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: All right, and Ms. Remal, refresh me, who 
12 from the State was handling -
13 MS. REMAL: Ms. Wissler. 
14 MS. WISSLER: It's me, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Who? 
16 MS. REMAL: Ms. Wissler, who's here. 
17 J THE COURT: Ms. Wissler. There she is. All right. 
18 I had indicated that I would advise you today of my ruling and 
19 I then see where that places us and I'm in a position to do that. 
20 MS. REMAL: Mr. Allred isn't here, Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Yes, I remember Mr. Allred. I have 
22 looked long and hard at this issue. I've had a law clerk 
23 looking at it as well to give me another perspective. 
24 Thank you. 
25 And have made a determination, having read what I 
26 consider to be the important law in this area, and I will just 
1 
1 ' indicate the proposed ruling that the defendant's first 
2 I statement was obtained in violation and that I would keep it 
i 
3 out I'm going to adhere to, I'm not going to allow in the 
4 ' first statement. However, I am going to find that that 
5 j statement, although in violation of Miranda, because the 
6 | defendant quite simply had not been Mirandized, was a voluntary 
I 
7 ' statement, wasn't coerced. It wasn't in any way forced. The 
8 defendant, who's a very pleasant gentleman, did not register 
9 any vehement complaints. The dogs were not there. So I find 
10 j that that statement was voluntary and there's no constitutional 
11 j violation. Therefore, the tainted fruit doctrine does not 
12 j apply or create problems in connection with the second 
13 statement. 
14 I have looked at the case of State versus Troyer, and 
I 
15 I also Oregon versus Elstad, and it's my belief that where there 
16 | is a Mirandized statement which is made subsequent to a 
17 I statement obtained in violation of Miranda, the second 
18 I mirandized statement is nevertheless admissible if the 
19 I defendant gave the first statement freely and voluntarily. The 
20 Court in Troyer stated it is an unwarranted extension of 
21 Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warning 
22 unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances 
23 I calculated to undermine the suspects ability to exercise his 
24 I free will so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent 
25 I voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some 
? 
1 j indeterminate period. 
2 So in this case the Court determines that the police ( 
3 I officers comments about the mean dog do not rise to the level 
4 of coercion, in fact I call them more sort of inane and 
5 ridiculous, although highly improper, and they did not in any 
6 way, to this Court's mind, and I base this upon statements of 
7 the witness and also the totality of facts and circumstances, I 
8 find that they did not in any way overcome the defendant's free 
9 will and since the Court finds an absence of coercion or other 
10 improper tactics, suppression of the second statement is denied 
11 and will be allowed. The first statement is not to be eluded 
12 to in any way. 
13 I also will talk at some point with counsel present 
14 to law enforcement about the stupidity, if you will, of their 
15 approach in bringing a dog to the scene and their ridiculous 
16 statement about the dog. But to my mind, the statement was not 
17 the result of the dog, and the mere fact that he was in a 
18 I vehicle at the scene at some point, although it's not clear 
19 j whether that was at a, same time that the statement was made, 
20 does not to my mind change anything, and the mere fact that 
21 Miranda was not given during the first statement does not taint 
22 that statement for the reasons given and both of the cases to 
23 which I eluded find the same thing. 
24 So the one statement will come in and you can 
25 certainly argue, Ms. Remal, that, you know, the reference to 
26 the dog and so forth was coercion or whatever else you think is 
3 
1 appropriate and knowing how good you are, you'll probably be 
2 | able to do a lot with the facts. But in any event, that is my 
3 ; ruling and I'm gonna ask the State to do a written ruling 
4 commensurate with the oral one I just read into the record. 
5 | Now this was also to be treated as a pretrial but I 
i 
6 j don't believe we have a trial date, do we? 
7 J MS. REMAL: We do for Monday, Your Honor, yes. 
8 THE COURT: Monday, okay, and are we going forward on 
9 j that date? 
10 I MS. REMAL: Yes. 
11 I THE COURT: All right, and is there anything I should 
12 I be aware of in terms of particular issues or problems that 
13 I we've got in this case? 
14 j MS. REMAL: The only thing that I'm aware of, Your 
15 I Honor, let me first check and make sure you got the voir dire 
16 ! and instructions that I sent over. I brought another copy 
17 | because I know sometimes they don't make it to the file. 
18 j THE COURT: Well, that was wisdom on your part, 
! 
19 | because I don't. I'm sure you did bring them knowing you. 
20 ] They have not made their way upstairs. So if both sides had an 
21 extra copy, we can copy them and return them to you. 
22 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, if I may approach. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Remal. Are these extras? 
24 I MS. REMAL: Yes, those are extras. 
25 THE COURT: Do you need them back? 
26 I MS. REMAL: What, what was sent over was an original 
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came before this Court for hearing in the above-entitled matter on September 1, 2000. 
Defendant was represented by counsel, Lisa Remal of Salt Lake Legal Defenders' 
Association, and the State was represented by Sirena M. Wissler, Deputy District 
Attorney for Salt Lake County. The Court, having received and reviewed the memoranda 
submitted by each party, and having heard evidence and argument, hereby enters the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On June 9, 2000, Officers Bruce Evans and Derek Dimond of the Salt Lake 
City Police Department were on routine patrol in the Liberty Park area of Salt 
Lake County. 
2. The officers' purpose in patrolling that area was to look for gang activity and 
drug activity. 
3. Officers Evans and Dimond \\ ere traveling in a marked Salt Lake City Police 
car. 
4. Both officers were in uniform, consisting of black fatigue style pants, black 
short sleeved collared shirts bearing the words "Salt Lake City Police Gang 
Unit" in yellow letters on the shirt's back, and black shoes or boots. 
5. Both officers were wearing standard issue duty belts, including firearms. 
6. As the officers approached the basketball court area of Liberty Park, their 
attention was drawn to six individuals seated on or near a picnic table. 
7. As the officers' car passed, one of the six individuals seated at the table, a 
person later identified as the defendant stood up and quickly shoved 
something into his pocket, then turned away from the officers and sat down. 
8. The basketball court area of Liberty Park is, and was on June 9, 2000, known 
to both Officer Evans and Officer Dimond as an area in which narcotics 
transactions frequently occur. 
9. Because of defendant's behavior, the officers stopped their vehicle and 
approached the six people seated at or near the picnic table. 
10. The group of six consisted of three males and three females, one of whom was 
17-year old Sonia Ortiz. 
11. Officers Evans and Dimond approached the group and inquired as to the 
group collectively whether they had seen any drug activity in the area, and 
explained to them the problems that have occurred there. 
2 
12. Officer Evans conducted a brief pat down "Terry frisk" of the defendant, 
because he felt that he needed to make sure that defendant hadn't been 
concealing a weapon when he was initially observed quickly putting an item 
into his pocket. 
13. The "Terry frisk" revealed no weapons or contraband on defendant's person. 
14. During their conversation with the officers, all six people present denied 
seeing or participating in any drug activity. 
15. The conversation continued for a short time. The six persons seated at the 
table were never told that they were not free to leave, nor did any of those 
persons make any effort to leave at that time. 
16. The officers satisfied themselves that none of the six persons with whom they 
had spoken were engaged in any illegal activity. 
17. The entire exchange between the officers and the six persons at the picnic 
table lasted between five and ten minutes. 
18. As they were about to leave, one of the officers' attentions was drawn to a 
black briefcase style bag located on the ground at one end of the table. The 
bag was five to six feet from where the males, including the defendant, were 
seated, and seemed to Officer Evans to be out of place. 
19. Officer Evans picked up the bag and, without opening it, asked all six 
individuals collectively whether the bag was theirs. 
20. All six, including the defendant, responded in the negative. 
21. Officer Evans noticed a couple of other people playing basketball, and he 
inquired of them whether the bag was theirs. They indicated that it was not. 
3 
. - . . I 
22. Officer Evans checked the area to see whether there was anyone else that 
could conceivably own the bag, but didn't see anyone else in the area. 
23. Officer Dimond then opened the bag looking for identification in an attempt to 
determine its owner. 
24. There was no identification in the bag. 
25. Officer Dimond did locate in the bag a couple of car stereos, some stereo 
faceplates, a few screwdrivers, a flashlight, batteries, and a green leafy 
substance that appeared to be, and subsequently tested at the Utah State Crime 
Laboratory to be, Marijuana. 
26. The marijuana was packaged in three separate plastic bags. 
27. Also in the bag, officers located approximately 82 empty plastic baggies. 
28. After the contents of the bag were discovered, the officers took each of the six 
individuals, including the defendant, aside separately, and asked each one 
whether he/she knew who owned the black bag. 
29. Officer Evans asked each of the six people "can you come over and talk to 
me," and then asked each whether they knew to whom the bag belonged. 
30. These conversations took place 10-15 feet away from the other five people -
just far enough away that the officer believed the others could not hear. 
31. Each of the six individuals denied knowing to whom the bag belonged. 
32. Each of the six individuals-was free to leave during the time he was 
conducting the investigation as to ownership of the bag. He indicated, "I had 
no reason to hold them." 
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33. Sonia Ortiz, however, at some point asked whether she and her friend might 
go use the restroom on the other side of the basketball court. Officer Evans 
denied her request, reasoning that he did not want the two to go together 
because they would then have an opportunity to discuss the issue of the bag. 
34. After each of the six people asked denied knowing to whom the bag belonged, 
the officers engaged in a conversation between themselves about different 
ways in which they might determine the bag's owner. 
35. During that conversation, conducted within earshot of all six people, the 
officers considered aloud whether they should calf in a K-9 unit. 
36. As a pat of the discussion about the possibility of a K-9 unit, one of the* 
officers made a comment about some of the police dogs being meaner than 
others. 
37. Officer Evans remarked that Salt Lake County had a dog that had nipped at a 
suspects' backside because the dog had alerted on drugs located in the 
suspect's pants: 
38. The officers never indicated to any person that a dog would bite them if they 
turned out to be the owner of the bag. 
39.UlflWtwasBtf police dog present at the scene during the conversation about 
40. BtftMhat then indicated to Officer Dimond that the bag belonged to him. 
41. Defendant was then placed under arrest, and Officer Evans read defendant his 
Miranda rights. 
5 
42. Post-Miranda, defendant described to Officer Evans the contents of the bag, 
and the origin of those items. He indicated, among other things, that the green 
leafy substance inside the bag was marijuana and that he had been selling 
marijuana because he could not get a job. 
43. Sometime around the time that defendant was arrested, Officer Serio arrived 
at the scene with a police dog. 
44. Officer Serio was driving a marked Salt Lake City Police car that did not bear 
any markings identifying it as a K-9 unit. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's initial statement to Officer Dimond, in which defendant 
admitted to ownership of the black bag, was made without benefit of the Miranda 
warnings, and is thus inadmissible at trial. 
2. However, defendant's initial statement admitting ownership, while 
violative of Miranda, was made voluntarily and was not the product of coercion. In 
the absence of such coercion on the part of law enforcement, there is no violation of 
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the "fruit of the poison 
tree" doctrine does not apply. 
3. Defendant's post-Miranda statements are admissible pursuant to the 
principles announced in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) and State v. Trover, 
910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995). Specifically, the Court has examined whether "a simple 
failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other 
circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will, 
so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is 
6 
ineffective for some indeterminate period." Trover, 910 P.2d at 1189 (quoting Elstad, 
470 U.S. at 309). 
4. In the instant case, although defendant's initial statement was made 
without benefit of Miranda warnings, it was unaccompanied by actual coercion. 
Therefore, the absence of Miranda prior to the initial statement does not sufficiently 
taint the investigatory process so as to render ineffective the subsequent waiver. 
5. The defendant made a voluntary and informed waiver of his Miranda 
rights before making the second statement. 
6. Therefore, the Court concludes that the defendant's Motion to Suppress is 
granted with respect to his initial, pre-Miranda statement admitting ownership of the 
black bag in question, and denied as to defendant's post-Miranda statements 
reaffirming ownership and describing the contents of the bag. 
DATED this y < £ y of January, 2001. 
BYTHEj^OURT: - e ^ 
lonorable LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Read and approved as to form by: 
LISA REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant 
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1 J THE COURT: Okay, all right, fair enough. 
2 Incidentally, Ms. Wissler, do you see any family members on a 
3 jury list, or anyone -
4 MS. WISSLER: I don't have any family in Utah. 
5 THE COURT: Anyone you know on a jury list? 
6 MS. WISSLER: No, nope. I looked and I don't 
7 recognize anybody. 
8 MS. REMAL: Sorry about the clothing snafu, but, but 
9 you look good. 
10 THE COURT: Yes, Michelle is about to give us an 
11 update on which jurors are not present and, Chris, do you want 
12 to go get the jurors, bring them up and keep them in that 
13 little area between the glass and the other door as quickly as 
14 possible. 
15 COURT CLERK: Number 4, Cooper, was on her way so she 
16 should be down there by now. 
17 MS. REMAL: Okay. 
18 COURT CLERK: Number 12, Mark Kilter, is not here and 
19 number 26, Elizabeth Swenson, is not here. 
20 THE COURT: Well, that's a pretty good turn out. 
21 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, there is one matter that I 
22 think we need to put on the record that Ms. Wissler and I have 
23 agreed to, but just so that the Court's aware of it. As the 
24 Court is I'm sure aware from our Motion hearing, the bag in 
25 J question contained what appears to be marijuana and ultimately 
14 
1 i was tested to be, as well as some other property which included 
2 I car stereos and face plates from stereos. It's my 
3 understanding that Ms. Wissler has instructed her witnesses -
4 j THE COURT: Not to allude -
5 j MS. REMAL: - not to mention specifically what they 
6 are. I think what she's planning to do was simply ask them did 
I 
7 Mr. Allred explain the other property or, but not go into what 
8 the property is or not go into what specifically what Mr. 
9 Allred said about the other property. 
10 THE COURT: Certainly seems like an appropriate way to! 
11 handle it. Is that your intention Ms. Allred [sic]. 
12 MS. WISSLER: It is. 
13 THE COURT: Ms. Allred - Ms. Wissler? 
14 MS. WISSLER: It is. 
15 THE COURT: I wonder how many times I'll screw up 
16 today. 
17 MS. WISSLER: And I did talk to them about that. 
18 THE COURT: All right, and if you would, if you feel 
19 I like you've got any police officers who are less likely to 
20 follow instruction, your instincts will tell you then tell them 
21 again, and if we get into a situation where it sounds like 
22 we're going to say something stupid, raise your hand, stand up 
23 and say may I have just a moment, Your Honor, and that would be 
24 better than having a mistrial. 
25 j MS. WISSLER: We actually did address that at the 
15 
1 A Correct. 
2 Q So what do you do with the bag then? j 
3 A I took a look inside to see if we could find any kind 
4 of identification, anything like that, and located some, some 
5 marijuana, quite a bit large quantity -
6 Q Okay, let me -
7 MS. REMAL: Objection, foundation, Your Honor. 
8 MS. WISSLER: Let me stop you there. 
9 THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
10 MS. REMAL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
11 Q (BY MS. WISSLER) When you looked in this black bag, 
12 initially what was the first thing you saw? 
13 A There was, there was some car stereos inside the bag. 
14 There was a baggie of marijuana. 
15 Q Okay, stop you there. What did this baggie look 
16 like? 
17 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I'd object on foundation. 
18 Certainly I believe the officer could describe what he saw, but 
19 I believe his conclusion -
20 THE WITNESS: I understand. 
21 THE COURT: Just, just a moment please. 
22 MS. REMAL: - he can't draw based on his lack of 
23 expertise. 
24 THE COURT: So at this point, Ms. Wissler, phrase the 
25 I question, which I think you did, but even more clearly, calling 
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1 Dimond, you know, we don't know who this bag is. We'd better, 
2 you know, see if we can find something so we can return it to 
3 the owner. 
4 Q Okay, and at some point Officer Dimond opened the 
5 bag, is that right? 
6 A That's right. 
7 Q Did you have occasion to observe the contents of that 
8 bag? 
9 A I did at a later time. 
10 Q Okay, how long after? 
11 A I'm not sure. I believe it was close to the point. 
12 I think it was after we had made the arrest or close to the 
13 point where we made the arrest. 
14 Q Okay, when you looked into that bag what did you 
15 observe? 
16 A I observed a couple stereos, couple, some tools. I 
17 observed a couple baggies with green leafy substance inside. 
18 Q Okay, when you say a couple, do you remember exactly 
19 how many there were? 
20 A There were two, two larger plastic baggies rolled up 
21 and then there was three smaller, smaller baggies that 
22 contained mar, -
23 Q Okay, was there anything else? 
24 A green leafy substance. 
25 J Q Sorry, didn't mean to interrupt you. Was there 
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1 I anything else in that large black bag? 
2 A And then there was a whole bunch of empty baggies. 
3 Q How many is a whole bunch do you remember? 
4 A Eighty, I think around 82. 
5 Q Okay. So what did you do after you opened this black 
6 bag and found all this stuff? 
7 A Well, we asked, we, we questioned, asked the six 
8 individuals, you know, did you see anybody with this bag? Do 
9 you know who this bag belongs to? I actually pulled each 
10 person aside and said, Hey, can you come talk to me for a 
11 minute? Asked them did you see who had this bag? Did you see 
12 anybody holding this bag? I went through all six and everybody 
13 said no. 
14 Q Okay, did any of these individuals ever make an 
15 attempt to walk away from the table? 
16 A No. 
! 
I 
I 
17 Q Did any of them indicate to you that they didn't want I 
18 to talk to you? j 
t 
19 A No. ' 
I 
20 Q Okay. Did any of them admit to owning the bag? J 
21 A No. 
22 Q Okay. Now at some point after some conversation and 
23 some further investigation, did you have occasion to arrest Mr. 
24 Allred for the contents of this black bag? 
25 A We did. 
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I 
1 I Q Okay. Can you indicate please who placed Mr. Allred | 
2 arrest? 
3 A I can't remember, we were both together and I can't 
1 
4 remember, Officer Dimond was talking and I can't remember if 
5 he, if he did it. I believe he might have. 
6 Q Okay. 
7 A I'm not sure. 
8 Q Did you, after he was arrested, have a conversation 
9 with Mr. Allred? 
10 A I did. 
11 Q Do you recall whether he was handcuffed when you 
12 initially made contact with him after his arrest? 
13 A I can't remember, I think he was. 
14 Q You think he was handcuffed? 
15 A Yeah, I think he was handcuffed. 
16 Q Okay, and what was the first thing that you did when 
17 you approached Mr. Allred? 
18 A Umm. 
19 Q After he had been placed under arrest? 
20 A After he'd been placed? I just told him I wanted to 
21 ask him a few questions and I asked him if he had ever been 
22 read his Miranda rights. He said yes. 
23 Q Okay. 
24 A I said do you understand those? He said yes. Then I 
25 J went through and explained what his rights were and asked if he 
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would like to talk to me. 
Q And what did he tell you when you asked if he wanted 
to talk to you? 
A He said he would. 
Q He said he would? Did you ask him specifically about 
the black bag? 
A I did. 
Q What did he tell you about that bag? 
A He said the bag was his. 
Q Did he tell you anything specific about the green 
leafy substance that we've been discussing today? 
A Yes. 
Q What did he tell you about that? 
A He said that he had been selling marijuana for 
approximately two months in the park. He says he sells the 
marijuana because he's had a hard time finding work. 
Q Did you have any conversation about the other items 
in that black bag? 
A I did. 
Q And did Mr. Allred tell you anything about the origin 
of those items? 
A He didn't. 1 
Q Okay. Now you wear a gun as part of your uniform as « 
does Officer Dimond, right? 
A Yes. 
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1 , THE COURT: Okay. 
2 
3 
MS. REMAL: We know what we need to talk about -
THE COURT: Why don't you do that? Where would it be 
4 i most pleasant for you to talk to him. Would you like us to 
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step out? 
MS. REMAL: We can talk [inaudible] -
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, there is another matter that 
I'd like to make a record about/ and that is, Your Honor, that 
I'm moving for a mistrial on two grounds. 
You can sit down, [inaudible] 
Your Honor, it was my understanding of the 
stipulation between the State and myself this morning that we 
placed on the record, that the State's witnesses were not going 
to bring to the jury's attention the fact that there were car 
stereos in the bag, State's Exhibit 1, and it's my recollection 
that both Officer Dimond and Officer Evans did, in fact, 
mention those. Although they did not specify anything about 
Mr. Allred's statement in regard to those. I believe that's in 
violation of our stipulation and, and further the stipulation 
in my view at least was based on the fact that that's an 
indication of some prior or other bad acts which I believe is 
prohibited by Rule 404 and that was my reason for speaking with 
Ms. Wissler about it. 
Secondly, Your Honor, I would move for a mistrial 
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1 ( based on the second ground and that is in Officer Evans' 
2 testimony it was my recollection that he said when he was 
3 describing Mr. Allred's being mirandized that Mr. - that 
4 I Officer Evans testified he asked Mr. Allred have you ever been 
5 I mirandized before. Mr. Allred said, yes, and Officer Evans 
6 J then followed up and something like so you understand what this 
7 means. 
8 I THE COURT: Oh. 
9 MS. REMAL: My objection to that, Your Honor, is that 
10 makes it clear that Mr. Allred -
11 THE COURT: I did not hear that. 
12 MS. REMAL: - has been arrested before. 
13 THE COURT: If that's what was said -
14 MS. WISSLER: And Your Honor I do -
15 THE COURT: Surely that was not said. i 
I 
i 
16 MS. WISSLER: - I recall that testimony and in fact | 
17 that was the reference. I would note, however, that there was | 
j 
18 no timely objection and there was no motion to strike. I 
19 I THE COURT: That's true. There was no motion to i 
I 
20 strike, no ability to clarify it because of that - [ 
21 MS. REMAL: And, Your Honor, may I respond to that? I 
22 I intentionally did not object because if I objected, that's i 
i 
23 just going to bring it to the jury's attention even more. i 
24 THE COURT: Well, I understand it's strategic. 
i 
25 j MS. REMAL: I tactically decided to make a motion for 
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1 I mistrial based on the testimony rather than take the chance of 
2 | 
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the oi: i ly good thing, because if 1 missed it, perhaps the jury 
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Do you remember precisely what was said and precisely 
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MS, HEM^il As best I recall, Your Honor, it was when 
Officer Evans was describing the Mirandizing of Mr. Allred and j 
t 
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THE COURT: Okay, I don't think then it's the problem 
that I initially saw it to be, I know unfortunately what 
Officer Evans meant and you know what Officer Evans meant. But 
the jury has no way of knowing what Officer Evans meant and he 
could have meant were you Mirandized a few minutes ago. It 
does not necessarily allude to or reference another time and 
another crime. He doesn't say were you Mirandized on another 
case. Have you ever been arrested before? Have you ever been 
charged with a crime before? He just says have you been 
Mirandized before -
MS. REMAL: Before. 
THE COURT: Which could have been -
MS. REMAL: That's what I recall. 
THE COURT: - in the last 15 minutes. Now we know 
that there was no prior Miranda, but the jury has no way of 
knowing that, and I would be willing to say to the jury that 
when, I'll make some kind of curative statement if you'd like 
me to. But I am inclined to deny the motion for a mistrial. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, it would not be my request 
that the Court make any sort of curative statement. In my 
view, if any or all of the jurors did not notice that 
statement, then that would simply bring it to their attention 
and I'm, I'm concerned about that happening and frankly -
THE COURT: What about a statement like this, Ms. 
Remal, and excuse me for interrupting. I should have let you 
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1 I THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative), I don't know that 
2 that, thank you, I don't know that that makes any difference. 
3 I The rights referred to are Miranda rights. I don't think 
i 
4 ! anyone could assume they're anything else. Do you? 
5 MS. REMAL: I believe that most people in our 
6 community are fully aware of what Miranda rights are. 
7 THE COURT: Yes. I know. 
8 MS. REMAL: And I, I think that as soon as that word | 
9 is said they, they understand that concept. 
10 THE COURT: The reason I would be mentioning it is 
11 not because they don't understand the term, but in order to 
12 have an opportunity to set the stage for going into this 
13 business about how when officers work as a team and one does 
14 one thing and one does another, sometimes they may ask the 
15 suspect, "Has that already been taken care of?" So that it 
16 I seems more innocuous. 
17 I offer it as a possibility and that may be one of 
18 the other things you want to discuss with the defendant. 
19 MS. REMAL: I think I would, Your Honor, if we could 
20 have a few minutes to do that. 
21 THE COURT: How much time would you like? You may 
22 have as much time as you wish. 
23 MS. REMAL: I think we just need 10 minutes or less. 
24 THE COURT: All right. 
25 MS. WISSLER: I'm sorry, are you prepared to rule on 
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1 I black bag, that there would be absolutely no inference or 
2 follow-up on the potential source of the stereos. 
3 | So Ifm going to deny the motion for mistrial on that, 
4 and in closing, the State may not allude to it. The defense, 
5 however, may allude to it. If there's some way that you think 
6 it can help you and you can clean it up because the best thing, 
7 the best possibility - and I remember this vividly - the 
8 stipulation, I should have on my own motion probably ruled that 
9 the stereo heads or whatever they were, were not even to be 
10 referenced as having been in the bag. But that was not the 
11 stipulation as I recall it. There was no reason for it to be 
12 discussed and consequently, it would have been cleaner had it 
13 not been, but I see no violation in the stipulation. 
14 MS. WISSLER: Your Honor? 
15 THE COURT: Yes? 
16 MS. WISSLER: Your Honor, just for clarification, I 
17 did make reference to the fact in my opening argument and/or 
18 statement and planned to in my closing argument the fact simply 
19 that Mr. Allred gave some indication to the officers of where 
20 the property came from. I would make mention of any part of 
21 what you said, but I believe that that's relevant to this case-
22 THE COURT: Where what property came from? 
23 MS. WISSLER: The stereos, the remainder of the 
24 property in the bag. 
25 J THE COURT: And what did he say about it? 
231 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
MS. WISSLER: He, he told the officers that the 
stereos were stolen and specifically that he had stolen them, 
THE COURT: But that is the subject of the 
ouipUidClC" 
:larifv with Ycur Hcn:r, prohibited me from making 
.:icsi'.; drgumenr, arjae " ; • ne '^ , > ".:,a ::is •ommerr.5. The 
urficei dOuut tub -.^w ^-!:P - • - -~ <~"'- ^11 ~ ->v:aence 
10 of the fact tha*- was 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
in -
WISSLER: . <a*. That's . 
W loSLiLK ; ., .^ a / . 
i'HE C ^  'FT: iou may -: ^  •, "»? - • -
reference t<~> wh „ . -ms wprp i ,.
 a, 
different " h ; r. 3 = .1: 1 / . :escr:oti -r 
w i -SLKF : :<ca v , ~ :\n :j
 a * " 
THE COI J R I" • Bi i t no r e f e r e n c e -
MS. WISSLER: No. 
THE C0UR1 "o stereo. 
: .ng t :: the stereo -
"*. I red made 
:escribed . :.e 
. was clear that he 
: wan ted . 
1 1 > 11 I ) I 1 1  m i It 1 1 1 HIci'11" 1 1 in ! I! 1 11 
word, 
132 
1 i THE COURT: Okay. Yeah the word should never have 
2 been mentioned. 
3 MS. WISSLER: No, not going to talk about it. 
4 ] THE COURT: As to the issue of the, the other, that 
5 is to say have your rights ever been read to you before, do you 
6 I want to speak to that issue? 
7 MS. WISSLER: Judge, only to say that I would be 
8 happy to try and clean that up in my closing argument and just 
9 J brush it, gloss over it and say as an abundance of caution he 
10 Mirandized him, not knowing whether another officer had 
11 Mirandized him or not and so he then read his rights and this 
12 is what happened after that. 
13 THE COURT: Well, I think that's one way of handling 
14 it. 
15 And Ms. Rental, I'll ask you to consider that as well. 
16 I'm also happy to try and do it in some way that's innocuous. 
17 The way in which it was mentioned, and I will view the 
18 videotape again tonight, sounds like it does not imply that 
19 he's ever been arrested before or ever been in trouble before, 
20 but because there are more than one, because there were more 
21 than one police, there was more than one police officer present 
22 he could well have been asking did the other officer Mirandize 
23 I you. Of course, those are not the exact words and, of course, 
24 I would be delighted if we didn't have this issue to deal with. 
25 J It was extraordinarily stupid statement and I would give 
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 ; anything had it not been made. Especially in view of the fact 
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1 I Having said that, let me give you some time to talk, 
2 as much time as you need. 
3 1 MS, REMAL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
4 [Whereupon a recess was taken] 
5 MS. REMAL: Mr. Allred is not going to testify. We 
6 I have, as I indicated, discussed that earlier and, and discussed 
7 j that again briefly today and that is both of our decision. 
8 I Secondly, we would like the Court to make a statement 
9 I to the jurors such as you suggested before about the reading of 
10 I rights and indicating that sometimes officers will check with a 
11 person and see if one of the officers have, have read the 
12 rights or not to, to have that information before they do that, 
13 or, you put it in a lot better that I did -
14 MS. WISSLER: And Judge, if you would like to 
15 reference the fact that I neglected to ask Officer Evans if he 
16 I had had a conversation with Officer Dimond about that issue, 
17 I'm happy to have you do that. If you just want to tell them 
18 that I neglected to ask Officer Dimond, Did you guys have a 
19 conversation about whether or not he'd been read his Miranda 
20 rights? And just to clarify that, that Officer Evans, would, 
21 however you want to handle it. But if you'd like to approach 
22 it that way, I'm happy to have you do that. 
23 THE COURT: Ms. Remal, would you like me to handle it 
24 that way? 
25 MS. REMAL: I think I'd prefer rather than have you 
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and gentlemen, t) ler e ar: e times throughout: cne trial where we j 
handle matters, and frankly it saves a xoi oi Lime/ out of ; /our .1 
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1 i presence and they all involve not facts but legal matters and 
2 I go over things and that's what we did and so sorry if the last 
3 ! break took a few more minutes than we anticipated. But we made 
i 
i 
4 ' good headway, and in fact we're almost done with the evidence 
5 I in this case. 
6 In occurred to me while I had you out there waiting 
7 and while counsel was visiting about a couple of the legal 
8 points that there are a lot of terms that we use when we do a 
9 trial and even though I'm sure all of you have degrees or 
10 college, we've got a very bright jury here, even so and even 
11 given that on t.v. now you hear a lot about the legal system. 
12 For some reason they find it more fascinating than those of us 
13 involved in it do. But even so, there are a lot of terms that 
14 are kind of alien or unknown to many lay people and I just 
15 wanted to allude to that. 
16 Chain is one of those terms. Obviously, you know, if 
17 you have a chain around your wrist that's different than what 
18 was being discussed in here. Chain is a link from one person 
19 who has control of evidence to the next person who has control, 
20 and that's a legal term that I just wanted to make sure you 
21 understood. 
22 We've talked about burden of proof and I'll talk 
23 I about that more in the instructions that I give you on the law, 
24 and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the standard in 
25 any criminal case, and I'll define that at some length, because 
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it's a concept that we grapple with and that is very i mportant. 
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case is presumed to be innocent and these are important rights 
and the other concepts are very important and so they7 re 
reduced to what we call legal instructions and I will read 
those when the trial is over. There are about 30 of them, but 
they're short, they don't take very long and then you'll take j 
them with you into the jury room and hopefully all the ! 
i 
questions I haven't answered about terms and what not will I 
become clear as you look at those. 
Now, Ms, Wissler, tells me that she has one more j 
short witness and that's Officer Dimond, who's she's going to | 
call to the stand briefly as I understand it first thing in the j 
l 
morning and Ms. Remal has one brief witness who she will be j 
calling in the morning. 
We could start at 8:30 or nine based upon your 
preference. My guess is and I am guessing, we're not going to 
have more than 30 minutes of testimony or 45 minutes maximum. 
Do you think that's a fair statement? 
MS. REMAL: I think that's fair. 
THE COURT: And then after that bit of testimony, I 
will instruct you on the law. That takes about 30 minutes, and 
then you'll hear closing arguments from counsel. 
How long do you each anticipate or guess it will take 
you on your closing? 
MS. REMAL: I would guess, Your Honor, no more than 
20 minutes and very likely not that long. 
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1 , know how important it is to make weighty decisions, which of 
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course in my job I have to make all day, every day, and I have 
been so impressed with each of you and how conscientious and 
4 I attentive you have been throughout. I just want to tell you 
there isn't one of you who has drifted off. I know it's a 
little hot in here even. There isn't one of you who hasn't 
taken notes and paid very careful attention and it says a lot 
about each of you and it says a lot about how the system works, 
and I just wanted to thank you for that. 
Someone once said a jury is the conscience of the 
community and as I look at each of you I know that is true, and 
my friend, the alternate, Mr. Noble, I want you to order lunch. 
We, we don't know whether you'll be eating with the other 
jurors, but you'll be eating, and so we'll see how it goes 
tomorrow and I look forward to seeing each of you in the 
morning at 8:45. Any questions? Yes. 
JUROR ?: Is that here or in the jury room? 
THE COURT: In the jury room, and then Chris will 
bring you in here, you know, five minutes or so after you get 
here, and remember don't watch the news tonight. Consider it 
giving you a little break from the war in the middle east and 
all of the other things going on in the world that sometimes 
we'd rather not know about. And don't look at the newspapers. 
While it is my perception that this is not a high profile case, 
again you never know. There may be articles treating generic 
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SONYA ORTIZ 
having been duly sworn, testified 
upon her oath as follows: 
Direct Examination 
THE COURT: Thank you Ms. Remal. 
And Ms. Ortiz, it's important that you lean into the 
mic and speak as loudly as you can. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. REMAL: 
Q Sonja, would you just state your name for us and 
spell your last name? 
A Okay. Sonja Ortiz. O-R-T-I-Z. 
Q Sonja, where do you live? j 
A On - I 
i 
THE COURT: Miss Remal, could you just get a spelling 
on the first name as well - ! 
| 
MS. REMAL: Sure. j 
THE COURT: - since there are a couple of alternates? ! 
Q (BY MS. REMAL) Sure, spell your first name for us 
I 
also. 
A Okay, S-O-N-Y-A. ! 
Q Where do you live, Sonya? j 
A On 1749 South 900 East? ! 
Q And how old are you? 
i 
A Seventeen. 
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Q Sonya, I want to draw your attention to the afternoon 
or early evening of June 9ch of this year. Do you recall being 
at Liberty Park? 
A Yes. 
Q And do you recall if you were with anybody or were 
you by yourself? 
A I was with two of my friends. 
Q And what are their names? 
A Crystal and Megan. 
Q And -
THE COURT: I'm sorry, one more time. 
THE WITNESS: Crystal and Megan. 
THE COURT: Chris? 
THE WITNESS: Crystal. 
THE COURT: Crystal? 
THE WITNESS: And Megan. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
Q (BY MS. REMAL) Why don't you try to move the 
microphone just a little bit closer to you? We want to make 
sure everyone can hear you. 
Do you remember about what time you went to the park? 
A It was probably after seven. 
Q And when you got to the park, tell us what you did. 
A Just walked around. 
Q Was there a time when you started talking to some 
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other people in the park? 
A Later on. 
Q And who were these other people you started talking 
to? 
A A group of guys. 
Q Did you know any of those guys before or was that the 
first time you met them? 
A The first time I had met them. 
Q Can you remember how many guys there were? 
A At least five. 
Q And can you tell us whereabouts in Liberty Park that 
happened? 
A By the basketball courts. 
Q And was there something there for you to sit on, or 
did you just stand up? 
A A table. 
Q What kind of a table was it? 
A Like a picnic table. 
Q And do you recognize anybody here in the courtroom 
today as being one of those guys that you talked to? 
A Right there. 
Q All right, can you [inaudible]-
THE COURT: For the record, Ms. Remal, let me just 
indicate she's identified the defendant. 
Q (BY MS. REMAL) Did you ever find out what this young 
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1 i man's name was? 
2 A Tracy. 
3 I Q And did you talk to him among the other guys that 
4 | were there? 
5 | A Not really. 
6 J Q So you didn't talk to him yourself? 
7 A Huh-uh. [negative] 
8 Q Ok. Is that a no? Can I ask you to say yes or no, 
9 it makes it -
10 I A No. 
11 Q - a little bit more understandable. Thank you. 
12 A Okay. 
13 Q How long did you and your girlfriends talk to these 
14 guys before something else happened? 
15 A We were there probably 15, 20 minutes. 
16 Q And was there a time while you were there by the 
17 picnic table that some police officers came over to you? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q And do you remember how many police officers there 
20 I were? 
21 I A Just two. 
22 Q Have you seen any of those police officers here in 
23 J court today? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Can you see any of them here right now? 
i 
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A Yeah. 
Q Can you point to that police officer for us? 
A Right there. 
THE COURT: And for the record, it looks like 
Detective Evans has been identified. 
MS. REMAL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q (BY MS. REMAL) Do you remember how the two police 
officers were dressed that day at Liberty Park? 
A I think they were in uniform. 
Q Can you remember whether you saw how they got there, 
to the park? 
A [inaudible] 
Q Did you notice if they were in a car? 
A In a police car, yeah. 
Q Do you remember if it was a regular police car that 
says police on the side of it? 
A Yeah. 
Q What were the police doing the first time you became 
aware that they were there? 
A They had approached us and... 
Q And what happened as they approached you? 
A They had asked us some questions. 
Q Now, when the police got over to where you were, were 
all the same people there as you were talking to before? 
A No. 
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1 I Q What happened to some of them? 
2 A They walked away, they left. 
3 Q How many people were still there when the police 
4 j officers got there? 
5 A I think like, five or six. 
6 Q And were you and your two girlfriends among those 
7 five or six? 
8 A Yeah. 
9 Q And who else was still there? 
10 A Tracy and two other guys. 
11 Q You said the police officers asked you some questions 
12 when they got over to you. 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Can you remember what questions they asked? 
15 A They asked us if we had seen a drug deal or were j 
! 
! 
16 involved in one. I 
17 Q And what was the response to that question? 
18 A We told then that we didn't know what they were j 
19 talking about. ! 
20 Q And what happened after that? ' 
21 A They told us that they had received a phone call and | 
t 
22 indicated that there was a drug deal going on. And so... I 
23 j Q And what happened after they told you that? 
24 A They kind of looked around and they found the bag. I 
! 
25 j Q Now, at any point did the police officers ask you 
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1 your name or for identification? 
A Yeah, 
Q Can you remember when that happened? 
A Afterwards. 
Q And what did you and your friends do in response to 
them asking for your names and identification? 
A We gave them our names and our addresses and... 
Q Did the police officers tell you what they were doing 
with that information, why they asked that? 
A Yes. 
Q What did they say? 
A They said that they wanted to know where we were in 
case they had questions for us later. 
Q Now, you said something about them finding the black 
bag. 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Describe to me what you remember about them finding 
the black bag. 
A The found the black bag and then they asked who it 
belonged to. 
Q Uh-huh (affirmative). 
A And nobody seemed to know who it belonged to, so they 
kind of opened it and searched through it. 
Q Now, when they were asking who knew anything about 
the black bag what were you and the other kids doing? Where 
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were you? 
A 
Q 
We were just sitting on the table still. 
Did the police officers, at first, ask you together 
as a group about the black bag, or -
A 
Q 
bag? 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
At any point did they ask you one by one about the ' 
1 
Yes. ! 
When did that happen? 
Nobody admitted to knowing anything about the bag so, 
then they questioned us individually. 
Q 
- how die 
A 
And describe to me how that happened. Where did they 
I they get you individually? 
They pulled us off one by one and went quite a little , 
while away. 
Q And then after you were done talking with the police 
officer one by one then, then what happened? j 
A 
Q 
officers 
A 
Q 
A 
asked us 
Q 
We just went back to the table. | 
i 
Okay. Now, was there ever a time that the police 1 
i 
searched all of you? 
Yes-
! 
When did that happen? | 
After they had searched the black bag and they had 1 
who it belonged to. 
Describe to me what you remember about being 
i 
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searched. 
A They just told us to empty our pockets and they 
searched through me and my friends purses. 
Q Now, was there a time when you tried to leave the 
picnic table for some reason? 
A We asked to use the restroom and to get a drink of 
water. 
Q And who we? 
A Me and one of my friends. 
Q And who were you asking for that permission from? 
A Both of them. 
Q And what did the police officers say? 
A They told us that we weren't allowed to leave yet. 
Q Now, did the police officers ever indicate to you 
what was inside the bag, the black bag? 
A They pulled it out in front of everyone. 
Q And what - did you notice seeing something that was 
sort of a vegetable material, a green leafy substance? 
A Yeah. 
Q And do you remember where they were when they pulled 
it out? 
A Where the officers were? 
Q Uh-huh (affirmative). 
A On the picnic table. 
Q Did they actually take out that green leafy substance 
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and put it on the table? 
A Yeah. 
Q Now, do you remember the police officers ever saying 
to you what they do if nobody said the bag was theirs? 
A They said that we'd all get tickets for possession of 
marijuana. And we'd probably all have to go to court for it. ; 
I 
Q Can you remember when it was that they said that? j 
i 
A After they had questioned us and nobody still said 
anything about the black bag. j 
Q Can you remember if the police officers said anything j 
i 
about police dogs? 
A They said that they were bringing in their dogs to 
sniff out - to see if any of us had had anything to do with the i 
items in the bag. • 
Q And did you ever see any police dogs? | 
A They brought them, but they didn't - they let us go , 
before they took them out of the car. ' 
Q Okay. Now, did you know that Tracy got arrested that | 
day? I 
A Yes. 
Q Did you see that happen? ' 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And after he got arrested was he taken away from \ 
Liberty Park? | 
A Yes. 
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1 i Q Did you see how that happened? 
2 A They just drove him away. 
3 Q Now, after Tracy was gone did you stay there at 
4 | Liberty Park or what did you do? 
5 j A We stood there till, like, 10, 11:00 that night. 
6 | Q Okay. And when you say we stayed there, who else 
7 besides you? 
8 A Just me and my two girlfriends. 
9 Q Did anybody else that you had talked to previously 
10 come and talk to you after Tracy was gone? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q Who was that? 
13 A One of the guys that had first called us over had 
14 come back about an hour, hour and a half later. 
15 Q An hour and a half later after what? 
16 A After the police had left. 
17 Q And did you ever find out that person's name? 
18 A I think it was Clay. 
19 Q And what makes you think it was Clay? 
20 A Cause earlier that's the name that he had given me 
21 and two of my friends. 
22 Q Now, was Clay there when the police officers had been 
23 there before? 
24 j A He was one of the guys that had left. 
25 Q And when Clay came back did he notice that the black 
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bag was gone? 
MS. WISSLER: Objection to what someone else noticed, 
Your Honor. Not applying personal knowledge. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q [BY MS. REMAL] Did Clay indicate whether or not he 
noticed that the bag was gone? 
MS. WISSLER: Objection, calls for hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I don't believe that it calls 
for hearsay. At this point I'm asking her a yes or no. 
THE COURT: All right. Rephrase - say it again, if 
you would please. 
Q (BY MS. REMAL) Was there something - and I want you 
to just answer this yes or no. Was there something that Clay 
said that indicated whether he noticed the bag was gone or not. 
A Yes. 
THE COURT: You can answer that yes or no. 
Q (BY MS. REMAL) Did Clay - what was Clay's demeanor 
when he came back? 
A He was angry. 
Q And did he say something about why he was angry? 
THE COURT: That can be answered yes or no. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q (BY MS. REMAL) What did he say about why he was 
angry? 
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1 i MS. WISSLER: Objection, calls for hearsay, 
2 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I believe that it is an 
3 I excited utterance, it has to - it relates specifically to the 
4 ! reason that he was angry, and I believe that that clearly fits 
5 within the excited utterance. 
6 (Whereupon a sidebar was held) 
7 I MS. REMAL: Thank you, Your Honor. I have no further 
8 questions of Ms. Ortiz, but Ms. Wissler may have some 
9 I questions. 
10 THE COURT: All right, cross examination? 
11 CROSS EXAMINATION 
12 BY MS. WISSLER: 
13 Q Ms. Ortiz, you indicated that you were at the park -
14 at Liberty Park, on June 9th and you got there about seven 
15 o'clock; is that right? I 
16 A Around there. I 
j 
17 THE COURT: You need to answer - j 
I i 
18 j THE WITNESS: Yes. j 
19 | Q (BY MS. WISSLER) And you think you talked to these | 
I l 
20 three guys, or five guys that were there for how long, before j 
21 the police officers arrived? ! 
22 A Fifteen to 20 minutes. j 
i 
23 Q So what's your best recollection of what time it was , 
24 when the police officers arrived, if you know? ' 
i i 
25 A I'm not sure. 
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1 , Q Okay. And you - it's your testimony that you had not 
2 met Mr. Allred before June 9th; is that right? 
3 I A Yes. 
4 Q And have you talked to him since then? 
5 I A No. 
6 Q You indicated that at some point during the incident 
7 you saw a police dog or some police dogs; is that right? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Do you remember how many dogs you saw? 
10 A I'm pretty sure it was just one. 
11 Q Do you remember what kind of dog that was or do you 
12 know what kind of dog it was? 
13 A I have no idea. 
14 Q How far away were you when you saw the dog? 
15 A Like, 10 feet. 
16 I Q Okay. And you - but you don't know what kind of dog 
17 it is -
18 A Huh-uh. [negative] 
19 Q - was. 
20 A No. 
21 Q You indicated to Ms. Remal just a while ago that the 
22 officers told you that if you didn't tell them whose bag it was 
23 you were all going to get tickets for possession of marijuana; 
24 is that what you said? 
25 A Yeah. 
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Q Do you recall testifying in a motion - or in a 
previous hearing in this case on September l3t? 
A Yes. 
Q Was that - that was in this courtroom; is that 
right? 
A Yes. 
Q And that was in front of Judge Lewis? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Do you remember Ms. Remal asking you some 
questions along these same lines that she asked you questions 
about today? 
A Yes. 
Q And you didn' t say anything on September l3t about 
the officers telling you that you were going to get a ticket, 
did you? 
A I think I did. 
Q Okay, you think that you testified on September l3t 
that they officers told you that you were going to get a 
ticket? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. Do you also recall testifying on September 1' 
about the issue of the conversation involving the dog? 
A Yeah. 
Q Between the two officers; is that right? 
A Yes. 
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1 i Q Did the officers ever say anything to you - to you 
2 specifically about the dog? 
3 ] A No. 
4 j Q Okay. And you testified again today about the 
5 I conversation about the dog; is that right? 
6 I A Yes. 
7 Q Okay. And it's your testimony, is it not, that the 
8 officers told you that they were going to bring the dog in, and 
9 that the dog would be able to sense it if you had any 
10 involvement in the bag; is that correct? 
11 A Yes. 
12 MS. WISSLER: Thank you, I have not other questions, 
13 Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Ms. Remal, anything further? 
15 MS. REMAL: Nothing further of this witness. 
16 THE COURT: Let me get counsel to approach again. 
17 [Whereupon a sidebar was held.] 
18 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
19 BY MS. REMAL: 
20 Q Sonya, I'm going to ask you just a few more 
21 questions. After Tracy had been taken away from Liberty Park, 
22 you indicated that someone named Clay came back over to where 
23 you and your girlfriends were. 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Can you tell us what you observed about Clay that 
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made you think he was angry? 
A He was yelling and swearing, and he was just pretty 
much mad. 
Q And did his yelling and swearing and being mad relate 
to the black bag? 
A Yes. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, may I approach the witness? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
Q (BY MS. REMAL) Let me show you what's previously 
been admitted as States number 1, and ask you if that is 
recognizable to you at all. 
A Yes. 
Q What does that look like to you? 
A That looks like the black bag that was there. 
MS. REMAL: Thank you, Your Honor. I don't have any 
further questions [inaudible]. 
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Wissler, did you have 
anything further? 
MS. WISSLER: Yes, Your Honor. Just briefly. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MS. WISSLER: 
Q Ms. Ortiz, had you ever met this Clay before June 
9th? 
A No. 
Q Had you ever talked with him? 
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1 I A No. 
2 Q You don't know his last name; is that right? 
3 I A Huh-uh [negative]. 
4 J Q Don't know where he lives? 
5 A Nope. 
6 Q Don't know anything about him other than he said his 
7 name was Clay; is that right? 
8 A Right. 
9 MS. WISSLER: Okay. Thanks, I have no further 
10 questions. 
11 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to ask the jury to 
12 step out again for a moment/ and I hope the donuts are there. 
13 And please don't discuss the case. It'll just be about five 
14 minutes. 
15 [Whereupon the jury left the courtroom] 
16 THE COURT: Ms. Ortiz, you may be seated. Did you 
17 testify at the preliminary hearing? 
18 THE WITNESS: What's [inaudible]. 
19 THE COURT: That means another courtroom where 
20 another judge was present and you were asked questions. Did 
21 you testify in such a courtroom? 
22 THE WITNESS: No. 
23 THE COURT: All right, so the first time you ever 
24 testified or talked under oath was in the hearing before me; 
25 is that right? 
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THE WITNESS: Yes, 
THE COURT: Why didn't you mention Clay then? 
THE WITNESS: In my memory I think I mentioned him 
[inaudible]. 
THE COURT: Oh, no. You did not. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, just -
THE WITNESS: I -
MS. REMAL: To clarify, I believe that she did 
mention Clay as one of the people she met. I don't believe 
that she testified and wasn't asked about this incident later 
on. 
THE COURT: All right. Perhaps you mentioned the 
name Clay. I do not remember that. And I took notes because I 
had to rule on a motion. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Why didn't you mention this alleged 
statement that Clay made? 
THE WITNESS: I wasn't asked. 
THE COURT: Had anyone told you not to discuss it? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Didn't you think that was an important 
thing to get out? 
THE WITNESS: I told the detective or investigator 
that had come to my house. 
THE COURT: What detective that had come to your 
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house? 
THE WITNESS: He's sitting over there. 
MS. REMAL: Mr. Couch had interviewed her, Your 
Honor, when we found her pursuant to notes that we got from 
Officer Evans. 
THE COURT: But you didn't tell the two detectives 
that were at the park. 
THE WITNESS: Well, they had left before Clay came 
back. 
THE COURT: And you didn't call on the phone to the 
police headquarters and ask for them by name and tell them? 
THE WITNESS: I didn't know their names. They said 
that they'd be in touch with us. 
THE COURT: And you didn't tell Clay to contact the 
police department? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Is that a no? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: You may stand down. 
I'm going to let you make a record of your motion and 
let Ms. Wissler respond. You know, one of the things that I 
find extraordinarily difficult to accept, to understand and to 
deal with is surprises in the courtroom. The law in real 
trials are not meant to be like Parry Mason, where pieces of 
evidence or newly discovered crap - or crap's the wrong word -
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1 data, is pulled out at the last minute taking everybody by 
2 surprise. 
i 
3 J Obviously, if the State did that there would be a 
4 motion for a mistrial, and it would be considered evidence that 
5 ' was essential and the failure to provide the same would be 
considered unethical, etc, etc. 
Different rules apply to the defense, I'm well aware 
of that. And I'm also well aware that Ms. Remal would never do 
anything unethical. However, I have some concerns that letting 
in information that the State has not had an opportunity to 
deal with or prepare for, certainly it raises the question of 
why. If Detective Couch was able to get this information, it 
was not available to the detective in this case, I guess the 
answer is that they were never aware of Clay because the 
defendant didn't tell them, and Sonya didn't tell them. And he 
was not present when they were at the park. But it seems to me 
critical enough information that if it had been given to the 
State t,hings might have been handled differently in a lot of 
ways. Isn't that true Ms. Wissler? 
MS. WISSLER: Certainly. 
THE COURT: Do you want to talk about what you 
understand the rule on site of evidence to be Ms. Remal? 
MS. REMAL: Yes, I do. And let me respond, if I 
might, to what The Court just said, for the record. And that 
is, it is certainly my understanding that the rules are 
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1 different for the defense than they are for the State. The 
2 i State did not do a motion for discovery asking for information 
3 from the Defense. And frankly, had they done so, I would have 
i 
4 responded with an argument and memorandum that Mr. Allred has a 
5 ' right against self incrimination, which is broader than just 
6 j him not being required to answer questions. And that I would 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
have felt that it's not constitutionally appropriate for a 
Defendant to be required to give evidence to the State. 
The way we discovered Ms. Ortiz at all was that at 
the preliminary hearing Officer Evans testified that although 
he didn't have the names of these individuals, that he spoke 
to, in his report - in his police report - that he believed he 
had notes somewhere at the police department which contained 
the names of the individual. And in fact he did, in pursuance 
to subpoena I obtained those. I then asked Mr. Couch to 
interview the people if he could find them, Through drivers 
license checks and obtaining Ms. Ortiz's address, that's how he 
was able to obtain the information about how to contact her 
and, in fact, did contact her. 
20 ] I did not ask her about Clay and his exclamation 
about the bag at the motion to suppress because it wasn't 
relevant to that. And she -
THE COURT: Oh, I think it was highly relevant. 
MS. REMAL: Well, in my view it's not relevant, Your 
Honor, and in my view it is -
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THE COURT: It might have resulted in a totally 
different ruling. If your argument is that someone is being 
coerced, and you've got someone who's going to say that another 
individual said in an angry tone, that was my bag, that's 
relevant to a motion to suppress, highly relevant. 
MS. REMAL: Well, I apologize -
THE COURT: Well, no -
MS. REMAL: - for not relaying that because it might 
be with -
THE COURT: I don't think it's -
MS. REMAL: It wasn't. 
THE COURT: Apology material. I think it's tactical 
and your aloud to proceed in a manner that you deem 
appropriate. I have absolutely no concerns about your ethics. 
Never have had. You're an excellent lawyer, and I think if you 
choose to handle things tactically in a certain manner that's 
an appropriate choice. 
My concern is, given that choice and the fact that 
obviously the information was available, the State could have 
asked for it. But if they'd asked for it in written discovery, 
as you point out, it would have been pointless. And the only 
other way they could have done it is to re-interview Sonya, 
which, in hindsight, should have been done but would be hard to 
predict. So what we've got is a situation where we have a 
person with a first name and no last name, who may or may not 
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1 exist. We don't know because we haven't ever seen this 
2 
3 
individual. You don't have an address for him, a phone number? 
MS. REMAL: No, we have no more information other 
4 i than what Ms. Ortiz testified to. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: So, we're not looking at a live witness 
who can be put before the jury, and cross examined. So the | 
l 
State has not right to cross examination. There is no , 
impediment to his testifying, that we're aware of, except that ! 
his last name hasn't been given. And I suppose if he's a ^ 
friend of the defendant the defendant would know his last name* | 
i 
And if the defendant - [ 
I 
i 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor - i 
i 
THE COURT: Just a minute, let me finish my thought, | 
i 
If the defendant is going to accept the responsibility ; 
! 
argumendo, for somebody else's property, that puts him in a I 
position where he's going to be arrested I think one would have ' 
i 
i 
to assume that would be a friend. You don't do it for a i 
i 
stranger. And that being the case, my guess is, either the j 
person doesn't exist or the person does exist and the defendant ' 
knows his last name. But the last name has not been provided, ! 
And the person has not been brought in. So the State, it seems [ 
i 
to me, is being deprived of the right to confirm him, to cross . 
examine him, and that concerns me. And I'm going to listen to , 
what you have to say about spontaneous utterance, but the J 
thread that runs all the way through hearsay and all the 
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hearsay rules, is inherent reliability. 
The reason we allow spontaneous utterances, under 
some circumstances, when they're truly spontaneous, is because 
there is an inherent reliability- If someone's hand is cut and 
they see blood dripping and they say, Oh my god, you must have 
cut me. That's because it's inherently reliable. Because it 
occurs without one thinking about it, it's spontaneous based 
upon some extreme emotion or some physical sensation or 
whatever. 
The other exceptions to the hearsay rule are also 
allowed because there's an inherent reliability. In this case 
where's the inherent reliability? We don't know the last name 
of this individual, the information has not been provided to 
the State. We still have no data about why this man isn't 
here, or where he is, or who he is. And the only thing we've 
got is a 17 year old girl who doesn't know his last name, who's 
going to make some statement about the bag, that apparently he 
made. And I don't see any reliability in that. There's 
nothing to support it. Nothing to corroborate it. The 
defendant, in his statement to the police, never eluded to any 
Clay, that I'm aware of. 
Did he, officer? 
OFFICER COUCH: No. 
THE COURT: Was he asked any questions, Officer, 
about whether or not the bag belonged to anyone else? 
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1 i OFFICER COUCH: No. 
2 THE COURT: But he was asked to whom the bag 
3 belonged? 
4 OFFICER COUCH: Yes. 
5 THE COURT: All right, Ms. Remal, I'm happy to hear 
6 your argument. 
7 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, of course I'm - as I've 
8 indicated earlier, relying on Rule 803 subsection 2 which is 
9 entitled excited uttering. In Rule 803 at the very beginning 
10 before siting all of the subsections - well, at the very top it 
11 says, Rule 803 hearsay exceptions, availability of declaring 
12 immaterial. There is a separate rule which talks about 
13 declarant being unavailable. With 803, it doesn't matter 
14 whether the declarant is available or not available. And so, 
15 it's not required that the declarant be available in order to 
16 be cross examined by the party of [inaudible]. 
17 In my view - and let me, for the record, although we 
18 indicated that this is the bench in case this wasn't loud 
19 J enough for the record to hear, it - I anticipate that if Ms. 
20 Ortiz were aloud to be asked, what did Clay say, he response I 
i 
i 
21 would be "The bag was mine. That stuff was mine." And in my | 
22 view, that fits exactly into the dictates of excited utterance, i 
23 which states, a statement relating to a startling event or 
24 condition made while the declarant was under the stress of I 
25 excitement caused by the event or the condition. The event or 
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the condition in this case is the black bag being gone. And 
the statement about the black bag is immediately following that 
and relates to the condition of the black bag being gone, and 
the statement is, the black bag was mine. 
THE COURT: Well, first of all, can you refresh me? 
I don't recall her saying when it was in relation to when the 
defendant had left. But my understanding is she stayed till 11 
p.m. or midnight and that this person came back some time 
later. 
MS. REMAL: My understanding is that it was about an 
hour or an hour and half later. 
THE COURT: All right [inaudible]. 
MS. REMAL: But the event that I'm talking about is 
Clays discovery that the bag was gone. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MS. REMAL: Which happened immediately prior to his 
statement claiming ownership of the bag. And so in my view it 
fits precisely within excited utterance and the declarant 
doesn't need to be available. And as I previously indicated, 
we have no more further information about Clay. 
THE COURT: I don't think the declarant needs to be 
available either. I just think that that is one of the factors 
that I can consider. It's not a definitive factor, but it's 
one of many in determining how reliable this is. The fact that 
there was no last name. The fact that he's not here to 
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testify. The fact that we have no other information about him, 
goes to the issue, it seems to me, of whether or not it's 
inherently reliable and credible information which underlines, 
as I said before, all the hearsay exceptions. 
Was there anything else you wanted to say on that? 
MS. REMAL: Just to respond to that, Your Honor. 
Respectfully, I disagree with the Court that you need to 
balance those factors. My reading of Rule 803 is that you look 
at the rule, you determine that parameters of the rule and if 
the statement fits within one the exceptions then it's 
admissible without requiring the Court to look to other factors 
to determine it's reliability. That the fact, in my view, that 
it fits within the exception means that our legislature, in 
adopting this rule of evidence, has determined already that 
that's sufficient reliability for it to be admissble. 
THE COURT: And my understanding, clearly, is that 
the hearsay rule, in all of it's aspects, is predicated upon 
inherent reliability. Each of the exceptions has that as the 
basis. There is, in fact, one catch-all exception that talks 
about all of the indicia showing inherent reliability. But all 
of them, even the ones that don't use that language require 
that that be part of it. And we don't even have a last name. 
Ms. Wissler, would you like to respond? 
MS. WISSLER: Just briefly, Your Honor. As first of 
all, I think there's a problem foundationally speaking, if you 
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will. Ms. Ortiz testified today that she had never met this 
Clay person before. She's not even sure that that's his real 
name. She just knows that's the name that he gave her. We 
don't know his last name obviously. 
THE COURT: Ms. Ortiz, will you step out please? 
Perhaps Detective Couch or someone else can step out with you. 
Don't want you to leave. 
Excuse me, go ahead. 
MS. WISSLER: That's okay. We just know that's the 
name that he gave her. We don't know if he was being truthful 
or what. We don't know his last name, we don't know anything 
about him. 
We also don't know whether any of her observations 
about him were accurate. She had never met this person before. 
She has not spoken to him since. So her analysis of his state 
of mind may be completely wrong. She's not in a position to 
give an opinion as to whether he was angry or happy. She can 
say he was yelling and swearing, and she did say that. 
But for - to predicate and exception to hearsay 
requirement - or a hearsay rule, on her observations of someone 
that she doesn't even know, seems to me to be ludicrous. I 
mean, it seems to me that the rule requires that there be some 
objective indication that this person really truly was under 
this emotional strain or under [inaudible]-
THE COURT: You're saying that in order to assess the 
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emotional stress or strain or what a persons demeanor was, 
you'd have to have seen them on more than one occasion to see 
what was normal for them. Is that -
MS. WISSLER: Exactly, we have no base line. We 
don't know what this person behaves like normally. We don't 
know what his natural demeanor is. We don't know whether, like 
I said, whether her assessment of his state of mind is even 
accurate. And so to predicate this extremely unreliable 
hearsay statement upon her observations of a person she had 
never met before seems to me to add additional unreliability to 
her whole statement. 
THE COURT: Ms. Remal, you may respond. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, my response is that I think, 
is one of the common - common aspects of human nature that when 
people are angry, the behavior of yelling and cursing often 
accompanies it. It doesn't in every situation, there are some 
people who, when they're angry sort of a slow burn and they 
become quieter. But I think that anger is most commonly 
displayed by somebody yelling and screaming. And so the fact 
that you may not have met someone before and know what they're 
normally like, that it's very appropriate to conclude that the 
person is angry because of that kind of behavior, yelling and 
screaming. 
THE COURT: Well, and I'm not sure that the emotion 
of anger is what was contemplated by spontaneous utterance 
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either. I think, obviously, it's talking about strong emotion. 
But anger can be something that is manipulated. It's not like 
spontaneous exclamation of some kind. And we're talking about 
an hour and a half after the fact. And I think it's very 
creative that you're saying that the action was his discovery 
of the missing bag. But the action, in fact, was what had j 
occurred around the table, and the defendant being arrested and | 
the defendant taking responsibility for the bag, and that j 
occurred an hour and a half before. Where was this person for 
i 
the hour and a half that he was gone? j 
i 
MS. REMAL: I have no more information than the Court j 
now does. I 
I 
THE COURT: There is no closeness to the event, j 
really. And I can't find that there is a spontaneity - it | 
sounds like he took an hour and a half to come up with some j 
kind of - or at least potentially, he took an hour and a half 
i 
to think about this. And that's why timing of spontaneous J 
utterance is so important, and had worked out some kind of j 
! 
statement. I 
I 
Also, discovery of the missing bag is not necessarily j 
i 
what I would call a startling event. I guess we'd need to do ! 
i 
research, which we haven't done. But generally missing | 
i 
property is not considered a startling event. It's something I 
i 
of more consequence. j 
I am going to, based upon the totality, disallow her j 
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statement about this individual and his alleged statement 
because I do not believe it is inherently reliable. Number 
one, Clay's full name is not even given. There has been no 
attempt to find Clay. And spontaneous utterances, despite the 
fact that hearsay says the Rule 803 says very clearly, 
unavailability is not essential, what one tries to do is put on 
the best evidence. The witness who made the statement. Where 
is Clay? We don't even have a last name. No effort has, 
apparently, been made to find him. We have a delay of an hour 
and a half between the excitement - the excitement being the 
arrest of the defendant, the acknowledgment by the defendant 
that it was his bag. The running away by this other individual 
if you believe he existed. And that's not close enough in 
time. I don't believe that his discovery of his missing bag, 
if it was his bag, is what's relevant in terms of determining 
the time factor. 
If it was his bag, the other question that one would 
ask if he were available for cross examination is, why didn't 
you take it with you? 
And I suppose, since I have already ruled, that Ms. 
Wissler may not go into, in any definitive way, the contents of 
the bag, and the defendant's statements about the contents of 
the bag, other than the marijuana, it would be extremely 
inequitable for me then to allow this witness, who had never 
before in the hearings she appeared at, render statements to 
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law enforcement, mention this other individual. It would be 
extremely inequitable for me to say, no you can't talk about 
what the defendant said was in the bag indicating his 
familiarity with the bag and his ownership. All you can do is 
go into what this other person who has no name said. 
If we had a last name, if we knew that this was a 
real person. If, for example, this were a friend of the 
defendant, who had left the jurisdiction and couldn't be found, 
I'd be more inclined to let it in because we have inherent 
reliability, or at least arguably that would be present in the 
friendship between the two. And the fact that we have a full 
name and it's not just somebody pulled out of the air. But we 
have nothing. We don't know if this person existed; who they 
were, where they got their information, and the very important 
rights to confront and cross examine, which are not limited to 
the defendant. But the State has a right to see witnesses that 
are given testimony. That's the reason why hearsay is 
precluded. And to cross examine is precluded. And this is an 
extremely important thing, and it's coming out - I shouldn't 
say thing, and extremely important piece of information - and 
it's coming out at the last minute. Meaning that it - the 
State doesn't have an opportunity to rebut it, or in any way to 
deal with it* And all of those things are of concern to me. 
So I find it is not a situation where we have a true 
startling event. If we do, the startling event is the removal 
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1 < of the bag and the arrest of the defendant. And that was not 
2 proximate in time to this alleged statement made by this 
3 I individual, Clay. We do not have the standard indicia of 
4 | reliability. We don't even have a full name for the 
5 I individual. And we don't really have an indication that it was 
6 I a spontaneous utterance. Part of that is the length of time 
7 that has passed, an hour and a half. And part of it is that 
8 I one can profess anger and scream and yell and that is not 
9 necessarily a spontaneous emotional outburst. It can be 
10 premeditated and planned. 
11 And if this information had been provided to the 
12 State timely, I might be willing to bend over backwards to 
13 I assist the defense in using this. That is to say, in looking 
14 more closely at allowing the State this opportunity. But 
15 there's been no chance for the State to have any kind of parity 
16 here. And as I say, I've even made a ruling that the content 
17 J of the bag, which the defendant was very familiar with, and 
18 that's obviously very important to someone else's claiming to 
19 own it. I made a ruling that that could not come in. 
20 So given the totality I'm not inclined to find - in 
21 I fact, I find specifically that it is not a classic excited 
22 utterance. And if it is, then it fails to come in because of 
23 its lack of reliability. Specifically that we don't even have 
24 a last name for the alleged declarant. And there is no other 
25 indicia of reliability, specifically the defendant never said, 
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1 talked to Clay, or somebody else may own this that you ought to 
2 talk to, or anything giving an indication that it was not his. 
3 On the contrary, he not only accepted responsibility 
4 for ownership and what the Court has found to be a non-coercive 
5 setting, but he explained why he had it, giving and 
6 explanation. And while the jury will never know this, he was 
7 very clear about what else was in the bag. 
8 Now, I have no idea what is in Ms. Wissler's 
9 briefcase on the bench. No idea because it doesn't belong to 
10 me and I have never looked at it. But if it were mine, I'd 
11 know exactly what's in it. 
12 Do you want to speak with your client Ms. Remal -
13 MS. REMAL: Yes, thank you. 
14 THE COURT: -and then say anything you wish to? 
15 Okay, I don't want to circumvent giving everybody the 
16 appropriate time they need. Ms. Remal, if you need more, you 
17 may have it. You can have as much time as you want. But if 
18 you're ready then I'd like to move forward. 
19 MS. REMAL: I think we are ready, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Do you... 
21 MS. REMAL: Mr. Allred is just reminding me of a 
22 point that I think is probably obvious but none of us mentioned 
23 which is, h* didn't know the name of Clay, he didn't know Clay, 
24 he coulda/fc have given us information about how to find him. 
25 And even if he did, we all know that realistically it's very 
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difficult to get a person to come in as a witness and on the 
witness stand admit that they've committed a crime, because 
realistically people are not very inclined to do that. 
THE COURT: Realistically, why would someone accept 
responsibility for ownership of the bag containing controlled 
substances if the person who owns the thing is not even a 
friend or someone whose last name you know. 
Where does the sense of responsibility, or the sense 
of a desire to help come from in that scenario? 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, that's going to be the 
subject of my closing argument. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let's go ahead and 
bring the jury - wait just a minute. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor... 
THE COURT: Just a minute Chris. Where are the 
instructions? See how close we are on that. Because you're 
not going to call a rebuttal witness, are you? 
MS. WISSLER: Was that a question or a statement? 
THE COURT: Well, it sounded like a statement but 
it's a question. 
MS. WISSLER: I'm not. 
THE COURT: You may if you wish to. 
MS. WISSLER: No, I'm not. 
THE COURT: Ms. Remal? 
MS. REMAL: I'm sorry, Your Honor, [inaudible] cover 
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